

ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

HOLD FOR RELEASE

SUN JAN 19 1964 AM

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
STAFFING AND OPERATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 11, 1963

PART 6

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1964

96-855

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas, *Chairman*

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington	KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina	CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota	JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
ERNEST GRUENING, Alaska	JACK MILLER, Iowa
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine	JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island	
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE, New Hampshire	
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut	
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland	

WALTER L. REYNOLDS, *Chief Clerk and Staff Director*

ARTHUR A. SHARP, *Staff Editor*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington, *Chairman*

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota	KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine	JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island	JACK MILLER, Iowa
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut	
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland	

DOROTHY FOSDICK, *Staff Director*

ROBERT W. TUFTS, *Chief Consultant*

RICHARD S. PAGE, *Research Assistant*

JUDITH J. SPARR, *Chief Clerk*

LAUREL A. ENGBERG, *Minority Consultant*

CONTENTS

DECEMBER 11, 1963

	Page
Opening statement, Senator Henry M. Jackson.....	385
Testimony of the Honorable Dean Rusk.....	386
Memorandum on the Department of State's Politico-Military Organization and Staffing, prepared in the Office of the Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.....	413
Bureau of the Budget staff memorandum on Improvements in National Security Administration (with transmittal letter by the Honorable Kermit Gordon, Director).....	421
Correspondence between Senator Henry M. Jackson and the Honorable Donald M. Wilson, Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency, and the Honorable William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.....	429

APPENDIX

Exhibit I. Coordination at the Washington level, comment submitted by Secretary Rusk.....	437
Exhibit II. Department of State details to other agencies (statement prepared by the Department).....	439
Exhibit III. Organization chart of the Department of State.....	441
Exhibit IV. Organization chart of the Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State.....	443

III

ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
STAFFING AND OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

[This hearing was held in executive session and subsequently ordered made public by the chairman of the committee.]

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3112, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Jackson, Muskie, Pell, Ribicoff, and Javits.

Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Robert W. Tufts, chief consultant; Richard S. Page, research assistant; Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel A. Engberg, minority consultant.

Also present: Hon. Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Benjamin Weiner, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration; and Richard R. Warner, Management Analyst, Office of Management and Organization, Bureau of the Budget.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN

Senator JACKSON. The subcommittee will come to order.

The subcommittee continues today its study of the administration of national security at home and abroad. At the center of our concern has been the role of the Secretary of State and the Department of State in the national security policy process.

It is our great privilege to welcome as our witness the Secretary of State, the Honorable Dean Rusk. We are most fortunate that he could be with us today, especially in view of the added burdens which have fallen on his shoulders because of recent tragic events.

The Secretary's record of public service goes back to World War II when he served with the U.S. Army from 1940-46, and as Special Assistant to the Secretary of War from 1946-47. He has had a distinguished career in the State Department as Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs, 1947-49; Deputy Under Secretary of State, 1949-50; and Assistant Secretary of State, 1950-51.

From 1952 to 1961, Mr. Rusk served as president of one of our great private foundations—the Rockefeller Foundation. In 1961 he answered the call to national service and came to Washington as President Kennedy's Secretary of State.

At the outset of the Kennedy administration, heavy reliance was envisaged on the Secretary of State and the Department as an insti-

tutional staff resource for the President on a scale commensurate with the full, contemporary reach of foreign affairs. The formalized committee structure and staff secretariats built up on the White House side around the post of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs were scaled down or disestablished. This was done with the declared intent of improving staff performance by transferring staff functions to the Department of State. The abolition of the Operations Coordinating Board and the Planning Board are cases in point.

Over the last 3 years, this concept of administration has run into certain difficulties and it is still in doubt whether the staffing pattern initially projected has been firmly set on the State Department side, so that the State Department can actually play the proffered role as the agent of coordination in all our major policies toward other nations.

As you know, Mr. Secretary, we on this committee believe that the Secretary of State and his Department must play a vigorous and leading role across the board of national security affairs. We want to be of help to you if we can in the continuing effort to improve the effectiveness of your Department.

We will welcome your statement, Mr. Secretary. We are very pleased and honored to have you with us this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I do appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you the staffing and operations of our national security policy. With your permission, I should like to make my opening remarks very brief, indeed, in order that we may spend our time pursuing those questions to which you, yourselves, would like to give highest priority.

It may be that there would arise certain questions on which you would permit me to give more systematic thought than I have at this point, and to furnish a memorandum or statement of views on certain points to you at a somewhat later date.

But first, I would like to pay my respects to your own published study entitled "Basic Issues." I know of no better statement of the problems involved and of the types of questions which are and ought to be in the minds of those responsible for the conduct of our foreign and defense policy. I therefore warmly compliment the committee on that study.

I should like to note certain factors which suggest to me that our objective should be that of steady improvement in organization procedures, but that we would be deluding ourselves if we expected from such efforts miraculous differences in our relations with the rest of the world.

In foreign affairs we are dealing with a world which we can influence, but not control, and it is a world of rapid change. We do business now with more than 112 governments. During the present calendar year, there will have been elections or changes in government in more than 50 of them, including 10 of the 15 NATO countries.

If we are to get an accurate impression of that outside world, we should look at not less than 110 maps, each centered on one of the nations we deal with, reminding us that we are the center of the

world only to ourselves, and that each nation looks outward from where it is.

I am not suggesting that we are not an important country. In fact, we ourselves should act on the basis that what we do is of the greatest importance, because that is the way of fulfilling our responsibility. Certainly in times of crisis our role is magnified, but in the ordinary flow of events our impact upon other countries is much less than we and others sometimes suppose.

For example, the Alliance for Progress represents about 2 percent of the GNP of Latin America. The 2 percent can influence, but cannot determine what happens with the 98 percent. We cannot buy countries or their policies with 2 percent of their GNP or less than 1 percent of our own, nor would we wish to do so. In any event, minor changes in organization within our own Government will not resolve quarrels between neighbors in distant parts of the world, nor blunt the objectives of international communism, nor make the rest of the world more responsive to our wishes.

The elementary problem of organization, at least to one who has experienced and seen many reorganizations in Government, is to find men of the highest competence to deal with problems which tax human capacity to its limits. The real organization, contrasted with that erected by law and pictured in organization charts, is determined by the flow of confidence from top to bottom and the performance which earns that confidence from bottom to top.

I emphasize the quality of people, and there could be some debate on this, I am sure, because organization seldom stands in the way of good people and seldom converts mediocrity into excellent performance.

Further, I would support the view implicit in your discussion of basic issues that the organization of the U.S. Government for the conduct of its foreign relations cannot be effectively studied or significantly improved by an examination of the executive branch alone. The Congress is deeply involved in the conduct of our foreign relations. It plays a decisive role in all actions requiring men or money. It has a great deal to do with the ability of the Government to recruit the best talent and to move at the speed required by the rapidly changing international environment.

It had not been my purpose here today, Mr. Chairman, to go into this aspect of the role of Congress as it applies to the subject before us, but I might mention two points which illustrate what I have just said.

We have had some discussion in recent weeks on amendments to the foreign aid bill, amendments which would have a decisive bearing upon our relations with a number of countries on a bilateral basis. The Executive has urged that the bill be as clean as possible. Now, one of the reasons for this is not just the traditional constitutional tension between the Executive and the Congress on such matters, but one of the reasons for this is that the legislative cycle is annual, at least annual, and events are moving much more rapidly than that annual cycle can deal with on a flexible and, I think, intelligent basis.

Along with that, when the legislature plays a card, that card is played and gone. We are thereby deprived of that card in our inter-

national negotiations and our international dealings. That lever is gone, and it is used.

Therefore, I hope that at some stage there can be discussion among the appropriate committees of Congress as to the role which Congress itself plays in the conduct of our foreign relations, and not just in setting policies but in the conduct of our foreign relations, to see how that fits into the requirements of a fast-moving world situation.

Now, at the other end of the spectrum, a matter that is not nearly so important although sometimes more painful, there are eight or nine committees or subcommittees of the Congress interested in the administration of the Department of State. Those committees frequently disagree with each other on such matters as personnel. To one committee an individual becomes a person of the highest qualification and competence. To another committee, that person ought to be fired from the service.

From my point of view as Secretary of State, I cannot see any other answer but that committees of the Congress should be very careful about getting into those matters which are, by statute, a responsibility of the Secretary of State. Otherwise, these tensions among the committees of the Congress make administration difficult and sometimes almost impossible.

Let me come back now to what seemed to me to be the starting point of our problem. I mentioned doing business with more than 112 countries. I mentioned that in more than 50 of those there would have been elections and changes of government during this calendar year. Now, I suppose there would be 10 or 12 of those changes of government which were unscheduled. I don't say necessarily unpredicted or surprises, but at least unscheduled. That creates a turbulence in our scene which, if anything, is going to increase somewhat, because we will have at least 125 or 130 independent countries before this process ends.

The little island of Zanzibar becomes an independent state this month. How many islands of the Pacific will want to be independent states? The prospect here is to me unsettling, at least.

But this multiplication of states has greatly changed the conduct of business and foreign policy in the Department of State over the last 30 or 40 years. I am told that the Department of State receives every working day throughout the year about 1,300 incoming cables. I will see 20 to 30 of those on a usual day. We send out 1,000 cables a day, on every working day, and I will see perhaps 6 of those; the White House may see 1 or 2. So when the committee says that delegation is inevitable, this is entirely right. Junior officers in the Department today deal with and have to deal with matters which before World War II would have come to the Secretary of State. The desk officer is the key post in the Department in our bilateral relations with other countries.

I feel myself that we should find ways and means, and I have taken certain steps to do this in some test cases, of upgrading the standing and the experience of the desk officer. He is the man who has the opportunity to brood 24 hours a day about the problems of a particular country. It is he who in Government makes a decision when he puts on his hat at the end of the day and closes the door without having done a particular thing that might have been done that day. It is

he who is in the best position to alert the Assistant Secretary or the Secretary that a problem is festering, that it needs attention, that there may be action to be taken to prevent a problem or there may be opportunities where by early attention we can sustain and promote American interests.

I think the State Department ought to move steadily toward—and this was implied also in one of your reports—the concept at least in its policy sections of all chiefs and no Indians, or at least far more chiefs and far fewer Indians. This would expedite and it would get greater attention and greater competence at points which are critically important in the conduct of our affairs, and would, I think, make it easier to get a broad understanding of policy and policy objectives through the machinery that actually is responsible for the conduct of our relations.

Then I would emphasize the role of the Assistant Secretaries, the next critical point. The Assistant Secretary at any given time may have 50 or 75 or 100 matters which should be of concern to him which ought to be on his worry list. Again, those higher up are somewhat at the mercy of the judgment of the Assistant Secretary, and his sensing of the art of policy in deciding what matters ought to be dealt with, and when.

I think we could all agree that there is a time for action and a time for letting a situation mature, but which is suitable in a given situation? When is a matter ripe for action? One can look at a worry list, as I have had occasion to do in the past, which is a year old. We used to use these lists when I was Assistant Secretary. If you look at a list that is a year old, it is really quite revealing to see what has happened to that list in the course of a year—which matters improved and which matters got worse, and which matters remained the same—and to find out whether there is any relation between your action or inaction and the course of events, and whether matters improved or worsened. At the end of a year, you can look back and decide that it might have been better to have left a particular item alone and it might have been better to have done something more about some other item. In this respect, the Assistant Secretary is in the crucial post in terms of the art of management of policy in our relations with the rest of the world.

Now, some, or most of our problems, in this tumultuous and, given modern weapons systems, increasingly dangerous world—most of our problems are not so much in the formulation of policy in its broadest sense, in its formulation of objectives. We are a certain kind of Nation and we are a certain kind of people. We have some well established concepts of policy to which we are committed and, indeed, if Government strays too far away from those broadest concepts of policy, the American people have a very effective way of bringing it back into the mainstream of our national policy.

No one, for example, up or down the line thinks that the United States will make an agreement with the intention of breaking it. No one will suppose that we will not try to conduct ourselves to the maximum extent possible in accordance with the norms of international law. No one supposes that we take frivolously the commitments in the preamble and in articles I and II of the United Nations Charter. The general principles of policy are pretty well established and rooted

deeply in the nature of our society. But these principles do conflict with each other in a given situation. They compete with each other, and in a tumultuous and highly controversial situation in some part of the world, the problem is how the principles bear upon that particular situation, which principles get priority.

It is the application of policy to particular situations that take almost all of our time. That means that we cannot always be verbally consistent in dealing with one situation as compared with another, because the situations themselves are contradictory. Therefore, if we support American interests in all of these situations, there will be times when our policy appears to be verbally inconsistent.

Now, in this process, it seems to me that there are two or three key points that need attention in addition to those indicated by the committee. The one is the matter of getting accurate and relevant information. The ghost that haunts the policy officer or haunts the man who makes the final decision is the question as to whether, in fact, he has in his mind all of the important elements that ought to bear upon his decision or whether there is a missing piece that he is not aware of that could have a decisive effect if it became known.

I think we can be proud of the extraordinary improvement in our intelligence- and information-gathering activities in the last 20 years. The need for it has been multiplied many times by the fragmentation of the world political structure, and the breadth, character, and depth of the information we need mounts steadily. When I was assigned to G-2 in 1941, well over a year after the war had started in Europe, I was asked to take charge of a new section that had been organized to cover everything from Afghanistan right through southern Asia, southeast Asia, Australia, and the Pacific. Because we had no intelligence organization that had been giving attention to that area up to that time, the materials available to me when I reported for duty consisted of a tourist handbook on India and Ceylon, a 1924 military attaché's report from London on the Indian Army, and a drawer full of clippings from the New York Times that had been gathered since World War I. That was literally the resources of G-2 on that vast part of the world a year after the war in Europe had started.

We have greatly improved our ability to gather relevant information. However, our problem is how to get it to the people at the top. When a crisis occurs, it is then almost too late to educate those who have to make the decision. The great problem we have is to prepare the minds of those who are going to make decisions for the decisions that have not yet appeared. How does the educational process go on? There are many ways of doing it.

There are systematic daily publications of all classifications from the intelligence community which feed to the top. I spend a good deal of my own time reading these and find them invaluable. I have been greatly helped in the past year and a half by a series of one- or two-page intelligence notes on the greatest variety of questions. I may get 12, 15, or 20 of these in the course of a day--just little snippets of comment and information about what is going on here and there, coming out of the machinery that has available to it the widest range of information. Many of them look ahead to possibilities, because a part of this matter of information is to alert the leadership to what can happen and what the possibilities are in terms of alternative

courses of action that might protect American interests in that contingency if it occurs in that way.

So I think that we need continually to work on the question of how to get information to those responsible for making the decisions in time to be of use to them. I emphasize the time factor. You can't go back and take a course in the problems of a particular area when you have to move within hours, or make a decision by not moving; so this is of some importance.

Then I think that we have a problem of how to get information to the Congress, since it does play a crucial role in our foreign affairs. I don't think we have fully found the answer to that question. Part of the problem is congressional time, because Senators and Congressmen have not only an interest in or responsibility for having judgments on these very complex matters of foreign relations, they also have a host of domestic problems before them, apart from the political processes by which they remain Senators and Congressmen.

So our problem is to find and expand the time made available by Senators and Congressmen to give us a chance to talk with them and get more information. We are more ready to talk to individuals or groups of Congressmen, than perhaps the Congress realizes. But we realize the limited time available to us. Through Mr. Dutton and others, and personal contacts by myself, I have indicated I would be glad to come down as often as I can get a hearing, in the most informal fashion, to talk over some of these problems for the information of the Congress. We believe it critically important that Congress be in a position to understand the full flow, the full complexity and the full backdrop of particular problems, since its participation affects how we organize ourselves for national security and national security matters.

I would like to underscore what the committee has said about the responsibility of the top leadership for administration. I believe this is important, and I give administration a good deal of my own time because administration should not become a thing in itself, but should know that its purpose is to administer something called foreign policy, and that the end object of administration remains foreign policy. It is not just a machine of its own.

Secondly, administration involves choices in using short resources for potentially unlimited demands—for additional services and additional personnel. The normal trend, not necessarily a happy trend of large organizations, is to grow. Allocation of short resources among different needs and demands itself presents major policy questions in establishing the priorities, and I think only those who are responsible at the top ought to establish those priorities.

Last year, for example, I took a series of Saturdays throughout the fall conducting my own hearings on our budget. I had the responsible officers come in and talk about personnel and personnel assignments and budget, not only to prepare them but to prepare me for the presentations to the Bureau of the Budget and also in preparation for the hearings of the four committees of the Congress. I think the administration itself has a very important responsibility of leadership.

On the role of the Ambassador I might make this comment: I don't believe it is true that the role of an Ambassador has been diminished

by the increase in the speed and expansion of communications. If you look back to the period when communications were slow or poor, the role of the Ambassador was not in my judgment nearly so important as his role today. One reason is connected with communications and the other is not.

The speed of communications greatly increases the pace of events. Therefore, the judgment of the man on the spot is just as important today as it was in clipper-ship days, because events are moving that much faster. There is almost never a week that passes when we don't have instances of a judgment that had to be made immediately on the spot by an Ambassador to deal with a situation before he could get this town to comment or give him instructions. I think that we ought to continue to set our sights on Ambassadors who have that capability even though there may be times when he is not called upon to use that capability in the most dramatic sense.

The other factor is that what the United States does in the world is so much more important now than it was 40 or 50 years ago, and this, too, greatly enlarges the responsibility and role of the Ambassador.

The principal reason why Ambassadors have to refer back so many things to Washington is that if he were left alone to decide what should be done to strengthen to the maximum our bilateral relations with the country in which he is posted, we would have accumulated requirements upon the United States for men or money far exceeding the resources available to us. Further, there is a vast complex of relevant legislation on which the Ambassador himself can't be an expert, and he may not know whether we, in fact, are able to do what he would like to see us do.

Then there is a third element—sound foreign policy. This runs directly into important domestic policies and domestic interests. I say this not in a pejorative sense at all, because these domestic interests are real. But an Ambassador has to have judgment from Washington on such a matter as straightening out our problem with Mexico on the salinity of the Colorado River. He can't move on matters involving oil imports or textiles or similar problems without Washington making the decision in the light of all of the factors, domestic and foreign, that might be involved.

On the question of personnel abroad, we are making a very intensive study at the present time on the staffing of our embassies, beginning with some of the larger ones, and particularly regarding the staffing from other agencies of Government. I am concerned that there are at least 44 agencies of Government represented in our Embassy in London. I would hope the committee would give us a little time to sort that one out before it looks too closely at that situation, because I am reminded of a remark that General Marshall made to me when he was Secretary of State. He recalled that in 1923 the Army sent a special task force to Europe to locate a good many officers who were left behind on various missions at the end of World War I, and couldn't be located. They were drawing their pay, but for 5 years they had disappeared from sight, and so the Army sent a mission that was called the "live graves registration team" to locate these individuals.

Well, there is a little of that that has to be looked into at every stage, and we are trying to do something about it.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, I was interested in your comments on the role of Congress. I couldn't agree with you more that there are things we need to do up here. Some of us have thought about a National Security Committee, or a Joint Committee, or joint meetings of the relevant national security committees at the opening of each session of the Congress.

One thing occurs to me as a realistic possibility now. If the executive branch of the Government would request, at the opening of the congressional session, an opportunity to present a national security briefing, it would force the Congress to act. Some time ago we consolidated the old Naval Affairs Committee and the Military Affairs Committee, by statute, into one committee—the Armed Services Committee. That occurred after we set up the Department of Defense. In other words, in response to the change in the executive branch organization the Senate and the House created the Armed Services Committees.

I should like to suggest that some thought be given to the fact that past important changes in congressional structure and practice have so often tended to parallel corresponding changes in the executive branch.

Of course, a national security briefing is something that the President himself would be interested in, but I do think that it would help us. We try to help you and maybe you can help us in forcing this matter to some kind of a resolution up here. I do feel that we could all gain by it.

It seems to me that part of the problem—especially in the field of foreign aid, and in the area in which the State Department carries a heavy responsibility as the chief coordinator of all national security matters—arises from the fact that Congress gets the national security story in fragments and bits. The whole case is not put together and presented to Congress in a clear and reasoned formulation.

Secretary RUSK. On that point, Mr. Chairman, there are various experiments which have been tried in the past. I think no one of them yet provides an answer. You will recall that Secretary Acheson met with the Congress to answer questions on one occasion. I think it was over in the auditorium of the Library of Congress when he returned from a foreign ministers meeting. That was a one-shot affair, and I think that he felt after that, "Never again." Opportunity for questioning ought to be continuous over a period.

In the first place, let all of the strange questions get asked and answered and out of the way, but keep the context going. This is the great advantage of the question time in the House of Commons. The membership is constantly exposed to the complete context in which questions can come up, so that the continuous process is important.

Now, the other point, Mr. Chairman, in terms of how this could be done, has to do with discretion. Actually, secrets in the most genuine sense make up not more than one-tenth of 1 percent of our business. If we are talking about those things which have to be secret, say from the Congress, there are very, very few secrets that have any serious relevance to the major policy issues confronting the country. They are much more limited in their scope.

However, we need discretion because we have four audiences when we talk about foreign policy. There are our own people in our own country, our allies, the unaligned countries, and the Communist bloc.

I have tried in my own discussions with the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees to go all of the way in candor in exchange for discretion. Now, if we could have at the beginning of the session a joint session of the key committees-----

Senator JACKSON. Or a portion of the membership of the key committees.

Secretary RUSK (continuing). who are familiar with this problem, yes, I think we could go a long way. Also, we need not limit this to the beginning of the session—we could do it every month or two. As far as we are concerned we would like to have a chance to do that.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, in my experience in the House and Senate and on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee we have not had a major leak or a critical security violation. We had one instance where a Senator who actually hadn't been to the meeting got on a television program and disclosed that we were working on something super or tremendous, and sometime later this turned out to be the hydrogen bomb. But during all of that period, I think there has been a very fine working relationship as far as security is concerned.

Secretary RUSK. I think the security secrets are recognizable, and would be somewhat easy to handle.

Senator JACKSON. This is a problem and it seems to me that the group need not be the large one that Dean Acheson addressed in the auditorium of the Library of Congress. It has to be limited in numbers. I should think that possibly the President might want to give some consideration to this idea. By having the whole picture presented, relating the various elements of policy, I believe the Department of State would be in a much better position to act as the chief coordinator of national security.

There are many hands involved in the national security operation in the Congress as well as in the executive branch. A major difficulty up here, and to a certain extent it is the same way in the executive branch, is that many people are acting on parts of the national security policy without looking at or understanding the whole.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks you referred to the interest of the committee in the special position of the Secretary of State and the Department of State in the conduct of foreign affairs. I might just comment briefly on that point.

We very seldom have any problem on this matter as between the State Department and the Defense Department. Our principal problems are where there are genuine clashes of interest between the foreign policy interest and a point of domestic interest as it comes up, say, from Commerce or Agriculture or Interior, where the foreign policy interests would point us in one direction, but our domestic interests would point in the other.

The question of the salinity of the Colorado River as it moves into Mexico is a very rough illustration of the confrontation of these two interests.

But I really believe myself, and I believe Secretary McNamara would bear this out, that this issue of the leadership of the Department of State in foreign policy certainly is not at the present time a serious issue as between the State Department and the Defense Department.

When I was on the General Staff in the Pentagon at the end of the war, the State Department at that time was not filling in all of the

needs for policy leadership and guidance that were required by the Pentagon, with its vast deployments all over the world. In effect, where there is a vacuum, those who have to act one way or the other have to make policy, and so we were making a good deal of policy in the General Staff at the end of the war.

But it has been my general experience that where the civilian and policy leadership of the Government is clear about what it wants, there is a high degree of cooperation from the Defense Department on those matters.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, I get the impression from time to time that the Defense Department does not always see the foreign policy implications involved in some of these matters. I will give you one minor experience. At the time of the flap with Canada a little over a year ago, I had a colonel come into my office who was about to announce that we were going to deploy our fighters across the line into Canada. Our fighters, of course, carry the air-to-air missile with the nuclear warhead. He was all ready to make the announcement.

I said, "Fine, I have only one suggestion. I think you had better get hold of your superior and suggest that he may want to talk to the State Department about that."

If he had gone ahead and just made this release, we would have notably added to the already serious flap with Canada over BOMARC. I cite this as an example. The colonel just hadn't seen it. There are many other instances.

What about the cancellation of SKYBOLT, where we got into what seems to me a lot of serious and unnecessary trouble? Recently there was Operation Big Lift where, because of the timing and the way we did it, the Germans got very disturbed. I am wondering if the Defense Department does fully coordinate with the State Department.

This is not in derogation of your work. I am trying to point out that when you have an establishment with as much power and as much interest—\$50 billion of the budget—it is bound to do things that are going to have tremendous foreign policy implications. This is a great temptation. It is important that they submit to the overall responsibility of the State Department in the field of foreign relations.

Secretary RUSK. I think that there are two different kinds of questions there. One is whether in a large organization someone down the line will do something that causes problems for the department in which he is working, as well as for us in the State Department. That happens to us within our own Department, where some officer will take an action or say something or leak something which causes difficulty. We make a continual effort to meet with that sort of thing and prevent it.

On a question like SKYBOLT, Secretary McNamara and I were working closely together on that one. There was a problem especially of time that was related to the budgetary year, and the decisions that he felt had to be made one way or the other with respect to that in connection with contracts and the budgetary year.

But I just want to make the general point that we have very good working relationships across the river. Secretary McNamara is extremely cooperative. Moreover, we don't merely have a single channel of communication through the top, as once existed between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense—where communications had to be channeled through the Secretary's own office—but both sides

have stimulated contacts up and down the line, from General Staff to desk officers, so that the two departments understand each other's problems much more effectively.

I think also the cumulative effect over the years of the War College association has been very helpful to both sides in this matter. But it is a problem that needs constant attention.

Senator JACKSON. SKYBOLT, for example, involved a major foreign policy issue. It seems to me that this was an example of the real dangers of a "one-thing-at-a-time-on-its-own-terms" approach. The Defense Department really missed the implications of this. And there was no excuse for misreading the implications of the recent Operation Big Lift. Apparently they went ahead and announced it without you folks having an opportunity to properly inform the governments involved.

Secretary RUSK. Well, this had been relayed on through NATO discussions sometime in advance, but the only real complication of Big Lift was a speech in which the general language sounded like something far more substantial than, in fact, was involved, so Big Lift got mixed up with the notion that the purpose was to withdraw divisions from Europe. That had to be straightened out and clarified right away.

Senator JACKSON. All of this, seems to me, points up the important role that the Secretary of State has in the Government in directing our national security efforts. I think many people get the idea that because the Defense Department has a budget of over \$50 billion, somehow the Defense Department is the total means of providing for the security of the United States of America. Yet the State Department has a central role.

You alluded to one thing here that to my mind is very, very critical; that is, the need to get accurate and relevant information. We have the strength and the power, but of overriding importance is the ability to get timely and accurate information so that sound decisions can be made at the top.

Likewise, it is essential that the people who wield great power—potential military power—understand that the State Department is, after all, the agency of Government that has the responsibility for foreign policy, and that they have to submit to the leading role of the State Department in national security affairs.

We have had SKYBOLT, and Operation Big Lift, and others, and we will have more unhappy cases in the future unless the officials fully comprehend this. I say this all in a spirit of trying to build up the State Department and help our people realize that it has the predominant role in national security. We know that the State Department has been a target for all of the problems of the cold war because it is called the State Department—it is the Foreign Office. It is a very popular target—and does not have any constituents. Therefore, we want to try to help in every way we can to see to it that the State Department is able to build its strength and carry out its responsibility as chief coordinator of our growing and more complex national security.

Secretary RUSK. Well, there were some officers in our Department who were concerned about the final solution that was worked out with

the British on the SKYBOLT problem, but that was differences of view within my own Department and not necessarily a lack of coordination between me and Bob McNamara, for example.

Senator JACKSON. Take another case—the recent speech by the Secretary of Defense before the Economic Club of New York with its estimates of our power vis-a-vis the Soviets. The Germans and the French disagree with our conclusions about the number of Soviet divisions. The Secretary's version of allied strength vis-a-vis Soviet strength obviously confused our allies and stirred a big flap. Some people take it as an indication that we are about to pull back some of our ground forces from Europe again, because they are not needed there.

Yet General Norstad, General Gruenther, and General Eisenhower spent their blood and sweat and tears over there trying to get all of the NATO countries to add to the ground forces.

Secretary RUSK. Now, the key point there is that much of the resistance to adding to the conventional forces of NATO has been based on the idea that it wouldn't do any good because of the mass on the other side. Part of the purpose of McNamara's speech was to lay a groundwork for saying that you can meet the Soviet conventional force up to a point, without standing in fear and trembling. You have this NATO alliance with 500 million people facing eastward, a nation with 200 million manpower, and not knowing whether to add or subtract from their own strength, and their own allies, in a confrontation with the West.

Senator JACKSON. Don't you think the military leaders have been aware of this for a long time? Our nuclear deterrent has been more than sufficient to outflank the superiority in ground forces enjoyed by the bloc. This has been a known fact.

My point is that at a time when all our commanders at SHAPE have tried to get the NATO partners to truly make a contribution to ground forces, the way the Secretary of Defense presented the case pulled the rug right out from under the sound efforts they have been making since 1949.

Secretary RUSK. Well, one of the purposes of it was to pull the rug out from under the counterargument that conventional forces are of no utility, because the other side had so many.

Senator JACKSON. I don't think the speech succeeded, because the flap up in Germany and France and in Britain, too, had just the opposite effect. Was that speech cleared with the State Department?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, yes; it was. Yes, indeed, it was because there was some material in there that was an important part of our argument to get more effort out of the alliance.

Senator MUSKIE. Could I interrupt just a moment? I have to leave, and I apologize for having to. I have to preside over another hearing, but I did want to say that I was delighted to be here this morning. You have one of the most incisive ways of getting to the meat of a coconut of a problem of anyone I have ever listened to, and it is always a pleasure to participate.

I had some questions, but really, in your formal remarks, or your informal remarks, you covered just about every area of questioning in which I would like to probe. I am just sorry that I can't stay.

Senator JACKSON. Why don't you ask a question or two now?

Senator MUSKIE. I wanted to ask this particular one. You have made it very clear that organization is not an end in itself, and I think that you have done it in a number of different ways. But have you found that organization in the State Department is an obstacle, to the degree that it is burdensome, because it can become that? You suggested ways in which it can become that.

I wondered, in terms of the objectives of organization which you have outlined, whether or not you are satisfied that the organization of the State Department is now meeting criteria which you set, or whether it is to a great degree burdensome.

Secretary RUSK. I would say, Senator Muskie, and this is a personal view that may or may not be shared by all of my colleagues, that inside of the Department our principal problem is layering.

For example, when I read a telegram coming in in the morning, it poses a very specific question, and the moment I read it I know myself what the answer must be. But that telegram goes on its appointed course into the Bureau, and through the office and down to the desk. If it doesn't go down there, somebody feels that he is being deprived of his participation in a matter of his responsibility.

Then it goes from the action officer back up through the Department to me a week or 10 days later, and if it isn't the answer that I knew had to be the answer, then I change it at that point, having taken into account the advice that came from below. But usually it is the answer that everybody would know has to be the answer.

I think we do need to do something about layering, and one of the ways to do this is to upgrade the desk officer level. It seems to me that the man in Washington who spends all of his time brooding about a country like Brazil ought to be a man comparable in competence to the man who is Ambassador to Brazil. We then clear the way for him to get quickly to the Assistant Secretary or the Secretary.

Senator JACKSON. Could you enlarge on that? What you are suggesting is the upgrading of the desk officer?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. I think that this is a very important contribution.

Secretary RUSK. We have done a little of that. A comparison is when a man of the stature of Averell Harriman accepted an Assistant Secretary's post and threw himself fully into it. On that same occasion we put some ambassadors in at even lower levels.

I want to get people of that caliber in at some of the important desks, so that you have a high degree of competence and experience at a point where it is most critical.

Now, inside of the Department, I would think that the layering problem is a key one. This has some bearing on the question that Senator Jackson asked, but I will come back to that in a few minutes. But in the main, the largest questions arise out of the organization of the Government as a whole. I am not sure that there is any complete answer to this, because, as the committee has pointed out, there is no real distinction between domestic and foreign policy any more. Almost everything we do affects foreign policy.

But these other great departments of Government do carry major and heavy responsibilities, and almost everything they do has a for-

foreign policy aspect, so that interdepartmental coordination is and I think will remain one of our major operational problems.

Now, the key there is on the critical questions involving war or peace, or crisis—problems of that level. The key question is not to leave vetoes dangling all over town, so that in the very delay in coming to conclusions we have already made a decision by not having acted in time.

One of the reasons for eliminating some of the formal machinery was to eliminate the idea that there was a veto where somebody had to be in on it, if, in fact, action was required immediately and right away, leaving to the Department of State the responsibility for getting the necessary coordination in the time that makes it possible to move.

And then the third organizational problem is the executive-legislative relationship, which, of course, vastly complicates the conduct of foreign policy. I would not in any sense change our constitutional system for another, such as the Cabinet responsibility system, but there is no question that this executive-legislative relationship is a major organizational problem.

Senator MUSKIE. I have just one specific problem to illustrate the point. You have referred to the tremendous volume of cables, incoming and outgoing. Who makes the decision, I assume it is the desk officer, as to the level to which those cables will rise in the hierarchy of the State Department?

Secretary RUSK. In the first place, the Message Center makes a preliminary judgment, and the Operations Center will make a judgment on those that involve political and military type situations or crises.

My own office receives considerably more cables than I am expected to see, so that my own personal assistant does some screening. I will call on him frequently for cables that he hasn't passed on to me that I have become aware of, or ask a question on which a cable happened to come in, but my own attitude on that is that the top policy officers ought to be offered more information than they may want to use or see, so that they can take the responsibility of thumbing through this, but reading that carefully, and being exposed to more information than they can possibly absorb in the course of a day.

So there is not too vigorous a screening out, because I feel that we ought to have access, and we make judgments in flipping through the cables as to where we want to put our time.

Senator MUSKIE. Nevertheless, the staff of the organization has more control over cables coming to you than you can possibly have. This is inevitable.

Secretary RUSK. Yes; I think that is right. I will meet three or four times a day with, say, an Assistant Secretary and the policy officers from the different parts of the Department who may be dealing with a particular question. At these times I get a full briefing on the cable traffic into that office, so I do get exposed to far more of the cable traffic than is represented simply by the cables that are on my desk in the morning.

Senator MUSKIE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator JACKSON. Just to follow up the matter of upgrading the desk officer, I presume you would select as a first step certain desks of obvious importance to be upgraded. What will this do, however, to

the problem of layering that you mentioned, as you see it? What impact will it have?

Secretary Rusk. It may be possible to eliminate the office level and have the desk officer not only report directly to the Assistant Secretary, but also to have the Assistant Secretary staffed to provide that desk officer with a good deal of the specialized advice that he needs and which we can't afford country by country. There would be an economics man, a labor man, and so forth; and these specialists should be grouped around the Assistant Secretary to help the deskmen on the special aspects of their problems.

There is another idea that to me makes some sense, for which we asked for funds this year, without overriding success, and that is to recognize that we ought not to try to staff the Department throughout to deal with the maximum load. We should not staff each bureau or desk to deal with a crisis situation in that particular country or that particular area, but nevertheless, we ought to have what might be called a pool of highly competent officers who could be used in anticipation of a crisis to beef up a particular country.

It is the same thing with communications. We need a capacity to throw rapidly increased communication facilities into a particular crisis area, whether it is the Congo or whether it might be Cambodia at the moment, or it might be some other place. A talking bird that was really effective could be extremely valuable to us as a reinforcement of communications capability in times of crisis.

Now, we ought not to staff for the maximum but we ought to have manpower resources to dispose toward crisis situations. I think that this would be an efficient and effective way to deal with this problem. We are doing it to a degree now. It is not only ourselves, but CIA and others are, so we can move somewhat more promptly, manpower from one post to another, and we will borrow here and borrow there to get this done.

Senator JACKSON. I am going to ask a question or two more, and then I will turn to you, Senator Pell.

You will recall Professor Neustadt testified before our committee, and he pointed out that no one in the State Department has had time to make himself consistently, and I quote:

* * * an energizer, catalyst, connective for the several sorts of planners, secretariats, task forces, and action officers now scattered through the upper floors of our vast new State building.

And then he added this:

The Secretary may sit at the center of this vastness, but his Office has almost no staff which he can call his own. To weld together such a staff out of these scattered pieces, to imbue it with cohesion and a Government-wide outlook, to implant it as a Presidential agent of coordination for the sweep of national security affairs: all this is far from done.

I would appreciate your comment on this critical matter of re-establishing the State Department as the agency effectively in charge of the conduct of foreign affairs.

Secretary Rusk. I would need to know a good deal more in detail about what Professor Neustadt has in mind about the actual organization, because the Secretary's Office at the present time, from the operational point of view apart from the organizational chart, is based upon the Under Secretary, the Under Secretary for Political

Affairs, and two Deputy Under Secretaries who are living right down the hall from me and with whom I meet at regularly scheduled meetings at the beginning of the day, and frequently more than once during the day. This group is supported by an Executive Secretariat headed by Mr. Read, whose job it is to keep an eye on the problem of coordination among the bureaus with what is now called the "Seventh Floor"—to insure that action moves promptly and in coordination.

Now, I would be resistant to a single channel by which business goes out of the Department, whether it is an Executive Under Secretary, or whatever the concept might be. Our business is too vast, urgency is too great. We have to have several windows opening and letting action out of the Department.

I believe it is up to me to be sure that the Under Secretary, Mr. Ball, and Mr. Harriman, and Mr. Johnson, and I are working on the same policy, in the same direction, so that as we assign responsibilities among us for particular situations, any one of them can go ahead with the full confidence and responsibility of the Secretary of State. However, I am a little skeptical of adding other steps in the machinery.

Now, if Professor Neustadt means that I personally ought to have a battery of special assistants around me, I must say that I would rather have Mr. Ball and Mr. Alexis Johnson and Mr. Averell Harriman dealing with those matters on my behalf.

So I would need to know in somewhat more detail exactly what kind of organizational change Professor Neustadt had in mind.

Senator JACKSON. Professor Neustadt states:

The Secretary may sit at the center of this vastness, but his Office has almost no staff which he can call his own. To weld together such a staff out of these scattered pieces, to imbue it with cohesion and a Government-wide outlook, to implant it as a Presidential agent of coordination for the sweep of national security affairs: all this is far from done.

I assume he is referring, in part, to a staff within your own immediate office.

Secretary RUSK. Well, they would have to be as far away from me as the Under Secretary, unless they lived with me in my own office, and I look upon these senior officers of the Department as comprising my staff for these purposes. They are able to act with the full authority of their statutory and other positions.

Senator JACKSON. But don't they have other responsibilities within their own areas that are enormous, just as you have? You have, of course, the totality of responsibility, but they are preoccupied with their own special responsibilities and as able as they are, they cannot really staff you in a personal way.

Secretary RUSK. The responsibilities of the Under Secretary and of Mr. Harriman are for all practical purposes coterminous with mine on policy matters. I say on policy matters because the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration reports habitually to George Ball or to me on what might be called purely administrative matters, so Averell Harriman doesn't get involved in that. Mr. Ball and Mr. Harriman and I try to divide up what would otherwise be my jobs, so that one of the three of us is working on those matters that need "Seventh Floor" attention in the course of any given day.

I would want to see in some detail what would be meant by "a personal staff of policy officers" that would produce some more machinery, in addition to the Secretariat which supports in common these senior officers I have just named, and who are perhaps the closest officers to me in terms of physical location.

Senator JACKSON. I have one last question. Do you feel that it would be helpful if the Secretary of State had wider latitude in hiring and firing personnel in the State Department? Congress, over the years, has passed so many inhibiting statutes that I understand it is often very difficult to really get the best people into the key positions.

I am wondering if it might not be a good idea to try out within a given area, on a limited basis, vesting broad discretionary powers in the Secretary to hire and fire and adjust salaries. Congress keeps talking about overstaffing. Suppose an experiment was tried to give you authority to adjust salaries, and to hire and fire and see what you could do within a given area.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would be very sympathetic to the flexibility.

Senator JACKSON. I don't mean to do it at once throughout the Department, but to try it out in a given area. We have done this with CIA.

Secretary RUSK. I would be very sympathetic to the possibility of being able to reduce numbers somewhat, increase rank, pay, and quality, and move toward more chiefs and fewer Indians. I think that could be done.

Senator JACKSON. Carve out an area and see what you could do, and make this as a request to Congress. Say to John Rooney over in Appropriations, and Senator McClellan on the Senate side, "We will actually ask for less money in this area if we have the authority to do so-and-so," and see what you could do with it. I think that you might give this idea some consideration.

Secretary RUSK. Miss Fosdick will remember that the Office of International Affairs that dealt with U.N. affairs in the beginning of 1947 had 230 people in it. When I became Director of that Office, I began checking around and discovered that the British Foreign Office had seven people working, and the Turks had one.

Well, we reduced the numbers to 150 and I am quite sure that we got more work done because we spent less time reading each other's papers.

Now, I think if you can build up the quality of personnel you can cut back in numbers.

Senator JACKSON. In this matter, it might be helpful if you could put the monkey on the congressional back. I am saying this as a Senator. I do not think that we have done our job and faced up to overstaffing in a forthright way. But a request from the executive branch might have some impact. At least it will give you an argument in your appropriation hearings.

Secretary RUSK. I will do my best, but I am not sure that monkey has very firm claws.

Senator JACKSON. He is highly mobile most of the time.

Senator PELL, do you have any questions?

Senator PELL. Senator Javits asked me to present his apologies that he couldn't stay, he had to leave for another engagement.

Now, as you may recall, I was with you at that time in SPA.

Secretary RUSK. The National Security Affairs Office.

Senator PELL. And I would agree with you that we did spend quite a bit of time reading each other's papers. I was struck by your thought of building up more chiefs and letting the desk officers have the responsibility that they should.

From my recollection, if it is correct, before World War II, that is exactly what we had. Isn't that correct? The desk officer reported in the midthirties to the Assistant Secretaries, and there was no office level in between.

Secretary RUSK. I think that that is correct, Senator Pell, and I would have to check that to be certain. The committee might be interested in knowing when these various echelons came into the Department, but it is my impression that you are right.

Senator PELL. I believe I am correct, and one danger that I see in it is with the problems of placing ex-Ambassadors. It could lead to the custom of more or less providing a roosting place for Ambassadors who are not reassigned. You would have to work out a balance between people of the ability you are talking about as opposed to finding a roosting spot for those without that ability.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, that would be a critically important matter.

If it should turn out to be looked upon as a place to put somebody that you didn't know what to do with, this would cut right across the whole idea. This ought to be clearly done with people who are known to be on the way up in their career.

Senator PELL. It already is, is it not, only you are thinking of people who are higher up on the road, because as it is now, my recollection is that the desk officers usually are pretty able men, destined for flag rank if all goes well in the final portions of their careers.

Secretary RUSK. A desk officer would typically be an FSO-3 or a 4 at the present time, but clearly an able man on the way up. I think that we might use FSO-1's or career ministers on the desks and see what the effect would be on the quality of the job done.

Senator PELL. Completely supporting that concept, how do you give real responsibility to the junior officers destined for greater things, who probably are desk officers? This comes to your earlier point that the line service could well be done in many cases by smaller numbers of people?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think this comes into what to me is the principal problem of bureaucracy, about which I think there is a good deal of public misunderstanding. There are those who think that the heart of a bureaucracy is a struggle for power. This is not the case at all. The heart of the bureaucratic problem is the inclination to avoid responsibility.

One of the reasons that organization seldom gets in the way of a good man is that if a man demonstrates that he is willing to make judgments and decisions and live with the results, power gravitates to him because other people will get out of his way.

Now, there is a tendency to want to avoid responsibility in a bureaucracy. Therefore, if we get people on these desks who are willing to take the responsibility that could be theirs, then I think that this could move. Our problem is to get people to occupy the horizons of their responsibilities. Now, this means, if you do this successfully, that

you have to let them make an occasional mistake, or at least you have to let them do things in a somewhat different way than you would have done it if you were the desk officer. Otherwise, this process comes to a halt. But I think we can take that in order to get the other advantages that go along with it.

Secretary Marshall was quite extraordinary in the delegation of responsibility. This will vary a good deal from President to President and from Secretary to Secretary. I have been urging my colleagues to emphasize over and over again the critical importance of the desk officer, and the range of his responsibilities not only for the day's cables, but for the planning responsibility. His primary job is to continue to think about and plan for an improvement of our relations with the country for which he is responsible, and I think that this can be done, but it will have to involve a good deal of delegation.

Senator PELL. Do you see how the problem can be faced of returning—or not necessarily returning, but achieving what to my mind is necessary, a relatively small elite service, capable of handling any kind of problems where the routine and humdrum jobs are usually delegated down?

Speaking in a very personal vein, but perfectly on the record, I do recall with great pleasure working desk by desk with you many years ago, and then going into the Foreign Service, and being in a couple of consulates general. In one case I was very content because I opened the consulate general and was in charge for a while, all the time being busy. But, in another consulate general I recall being where we had six or seven Foreign Service officers, as opposed to the British who had one, and the result was that we Foreign Service officers did work that Foreign Service locals or aliens, whatever they are called now, should have done.

This, I think, has an inhibiting effect on young men. I know that of the class that came in with me after the war, several of them have departed. Now I think under your inspiration, and under the philosophy that you have been enunciating, as set forth by President Kennedy, a certain excitement and electricity is in the air. I think President Johnson will do the same.

But do you see any way of bringing in the very best of our young men and keeping them so you don't have the best fellows pulling out? I am not inferring I was one of the best fellows. I did not do terribly well, but many of the best fellows are not staying, as you know.

Secretary Rusk. Senator, I will have to go back and look at the efficiency report I wrote on you before I accept that last statement. You did very well, indeed. But this past year we have taken some steps to try to reduce this period that might be called boot training. There was a theory that Foreign Service officers could expect inevitably to learn the business by doing or spending a good deal of time in the important routine functions of the Service.

Now we are turning some of those functions over to the staff and getting the young Foreign Service officer into a substantive and policy role just as quickly as possible after his appointment, in order to meet this problem of morale that you are talking about, and also to test him pretty thoroughly.

Now, we do have a problem in our career service that is dealt with in the military services by the up-or-out system. We have superb

personnel in the Foreign Service, but when you have people in those numbers there are going to be those who will quit growing before their time. There will be those who for personal or health or other reasons seem not to be able to maintain the pace required to take on the top responsibilities at the end of the trail.

We do have a selection-out process which those who are subjected to find sometimes very rough, but we have not yet solved the problem of what we do about those who reach their ceiling prematurely. This is something that we are very much concerned about.

Senator PELL. But in general, you would, as I understand your statement earlier, be of the view that the substantive work of the Department could be performed by a smaller number of individuals than would now be the case. I am not talking about the administrative level.

Secretary RUSK. If you let us select the individuals, and not simply reduce budgets to force the numbers to be changed, I would say that in the policy sections of the Department I would be inclined to think the answer to that is yes.

Senator PELL. Along the line of what Senator Jackson said, to give you greater flexibility in management?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator PELL. Now, another question that comes to my mind is how can we on the Hill be of greater help to you? I think, for instance, on the record it would be interesting to know how many times you have had to come before similar groups like this in the course of the last 3 years. I remember hearing some startling statements—was it more than 100 days you have been up here since you have been Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. I would be glad to furnish statistics on that. I do come down to Capitol Hill frequently, but—

Senator PELL. If there were joint committee hearings, would it be of any help?

Secretary RUSK. I would like to say that it is seldom that I find this a waste of time. That is for several reasons. This is the way our constitutional system works and it is one of my primary duties to be here. I would be available to come more than I do if I had an opportunity to sit down wholly off the record and talk informally and in great candor about some of our problems.

I think that is the kind of appearance or visit that is most needed. The ability to do that with the sort of joint meetings of the committees that Senator Jackson talked about would be a very important one; to sit down with the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services and one or two other committees together and go over some of these things.

Senator PELL. Speaking as one of the relatively newer members here who is not on one of those committees, but also representative of many of the Senators who are interested in foreign policy, one of the problems now is that unless one has the good fortune to be on the Foreign Relations Committee, or one of the other key committees, you pretty well are restricted to what you read in the press. That is one of the reasons why the idea of Senator Humphrey that there should be a general question hour every couple of weeks or every month might have a certain appeal if the security requirements could be met.

Senator JACKSON. I think the Secretary really put his finger on what is needed, just a moment ago, and that is, an opportunity for

him from time to time to speak off the record with complete candor to small groups. This is a difficult task, and yet this is the thing that is needed.

The Secretary has to be very, very careful in anything that he says for the record. There are many things that he could impart to us that would make our job a lot easier. And frankly, I think that he could do his job a lot better if there was such a free flow of candor. There are, of course, difficulties. It depends on people.

We were talking about people within the Department. You can talk with some people and it will be respected, and it will be used effectively.

Secretary RUSK. There are two or three reasons, Mr. Chairman, why this would be really quite important, in addition to those we have mentioned. We in the executive branch come and go. If you look around this town for people who have had to deal responsibly with foreign policy problems for an extended period of time, you find them on these committees down here on Capitol Hill. Therefore, there is great advantage to a Secretary or an Assistant Secretary in coming down just to talk—not to sell a point of view, but to talk, to get reactions, advice, and ideas before positions get frozen. That could be very important.

Then I should also like to comment on another matter which makes executive sessions of committees extremely important. I don't think, Mr. Chairman, that I can recall in 3 years an executive session of a committee at which we have talked over the innards of difficult and complicated questions where the discussion divided on partisan lines.

Now, there will be differences of view around the table, because many of these things require on-balance judgments, but it is to me deeply encouraging to see that in executive sessions where the merits are addressed and can be addressed in complete candor, that so seldom does partisan controversy play any significant role.

Now, when you get out on the floor in debate, you have other problems. But these specific sessions and discussions to me are the most valuable thing that happens in Washington.

Senator PELL. Do you think that that could take place with the Senate as a whole, or would that be too optimistic?

Senator JACKSON. I think once you go beyond a certain point in numbers, the very climate causes all of us to pull in. I believe this is inevitable, and especially for the person who is directly involved; the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. I think the very presence of numbers would forbid full candor.

Secretary RUSK. On the idea of the question hour, it has some attractions, but it seems to me that it would be effective only if it were done with sufficient frequency, so that you could build and maintain a context of discussions.

Senator PELL. This is Senator Humphrey's idea; that it would happen every month on a regular basis.

Senator JACKSON. Well, it takes a long time to build up that tradition. The British have been doing this for a few centuries. I am not so sure that we could accommodate to this in a short period of time. I think a lot of helpful things can be done in addition to what we are talking about; such as meeting with just one or two people from time to time, and even with one single Senator in a key situation.

I appreciate that you have time problems, but this is something that we ought to think about, and maybe make some suggestions to the Secretary.

Senator PELL. We could have more joint committee hearings.

Secretary RUSK. There is a special problem for what the British would call the back-bench member who doesn't sit on the committee which is regularly briefed. But I have also observed that committees—for example, the Foreign Relations Committee—are anxious that the back-bench members have a chance to be briefed, and I think perhaps that they might have occasional meetings themselves, or rather, make their room available for back-bench members to come in for discussions.

Senator PELL. I have never noticed that climate.

Secretary RUSK. Well, they have taken initiative with me on occasions, saying, "We want you to brief this committee," or the other committee, and so forth.

Senator JACKSON. Those of us who are on Armed Services, and Joint Atomic Energy, are heavily in foreign policy and we cannot avoid it, and I am not so sure we have done as much as we could in this regard. Some initiative must be taken by the Congress, and I think that you might in the meantime give some attention to that.

Senator PELL. I was very struck by your statement about the relations between Defense and State, and that you were trying to increase the lateral contacts further down the line. Along the same thought, or the same direction, in connection with intelligence, one thing that struck me when I was a desk officer, I must say, of a rather esoteric area, the Baltic States, was the utter lack of intelligence flow that I got from CIA. Now, the key situations I had to make were not world-shaking, but there was a desk, and presumably the same system of flow came to every other desk officer.

I checked this out with other friends of mine, old colleagues who are still desk officers, and there is not an easy flow of intelligence from CIA as to what is happening in their area. How could this be remedied, too, on a lateral basis?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. McCone and I were just recently discussing this question as to what happens to the output of it, so I am myself taking a look at the daily input from CIA for selected days, just to see what, in fact, comes in, and what is done with it in the Department, because I think that there is a point there that we not only need to get the information into the hands of those who can use it or need it, but we also ought to, on the basis of that, feed back suggestions to CIA, and the intelligence community, about higher priorities of information that we ought to be looking for that we are not getting, you see. It is that kind of thing, and it works both ways.

Senator PELL. To be specific, wouldn't it be a good idea if the old habit that used to be discussed was adopted; that of having the desk officers in CIA and the desk officers in State meet and exchange information? I don't think it has ever happened.

Secretary RUSK. It does when we are dealing with particular problems, like Vietnam, or things like that, you see.

Senator PELL. I would have much doubt if the Rumanian desk officer in the Department were acquainted with the men handling that aspect of intelligence in the CIA.

Another thought, perhaps along a different line, and this was brought out in our hearing with Mr. Crockett, is the question of encouraging Foreign Service officers, and State Department people, to go on leave of absence without pay. At the moment, as we all know, if a Foreign Service officer asks for leave of absence without pay for 2 years to take a job in business or a university, or in any other way, that is held to be rather poor school spirit; an attitude that, when it comes to being considered for promotion, is held against him. Accordingly, he wouldn't dream of doing it if he was ambitious in the Service.

At the same time, the young man in question might be considerably improved by going back to Chicago, or St. Louis, for a year or so, and coming back, reindoctrinated with affairs back home.

First, would you think it would be a good idea or not, sir?

Secretary RUSK. It is a good idea and extremely difficult to administer. Career officers are reluctant to take that on because they do have a feeling, and I cannot prove that they are wrong, that out of sight is out of mind.

Senator PELL. Exactly.

Secretary RUSK. And this is not necessarily helpful to their career. We have tried in the past to work out some exchanges. For example, a Foreign Service officer goes to a university, and the professor comes into the Department, and it usually takes a little longer than the 1 or 2 years available to get either one of them fully into his job on the exchange basis. But I think that there are some possibilities there that we ought to look further into.

I have no doubt that that kind of variety in the background of a man could be very helpful, and indeed it is because we do pull people in from outside of the career service for a number of key jobs, or from time to time make arrangements for lateral entry into the Foreign Service where it seems desirable.

But there are some administrative and morale problems there that we would have to watch very carefully. We are trying to do some of that by some extended home leaves whereby people can go back to different parts of the country and get reacquainted with the United States again, but again we have had inadequate appropriations to do very much with that particular problem.

Senator PELL. But it wouldn't take an Executive order of the President, just an administrative order from you, or from Mr. Crockett, or even as a precept to the selection boards, and within the Department itself, that would encourage Foreign Service officers to apply for these leave-of-absence jobs, stressing that such experience would be considered a point in their favor, and not in any way "out of sight and out of mind." Shouldn't that start this process going a bit more? It would not take legislative action.

Secretary RUSK. We have full authority to do this under existing legislation. I am not sure that the officers concerned would be fully reassured by a precept directive from the Secretary to a promotion board. I have issued these precepts on other matters, for example, experience in USIA or in economics, or at the United Nations. This type experience should be fully equated with the more traditional kinds of service in considerations for promotion.

Senator PELL. Or consular affairs.

Secretary RUSK. I can't guarantee that these precepts have had their due weight in these board processes.

Senator PELL. For this reason, I was in touch at one point with the White House, hoping they would issue it as an Executive order. They liked the idea, but there are areas of greater priority.

Secretary RUSK. I will look further into that, and I understand you discussed that with Mr. Crockett.

Senator PELL. Yes, I did. I have another thought that bothered me, and that is the problem of local employees behind the Iron Curtain who are arrested or maltreated or tortured and returned after a period of time with their health pretty well ruined, having been accused of espionage in an effort to try to frame our people.

It is one thing if they have been arrested for black marketeering or other criminal activities, but there are always instances where there are local loyal employees who are really given hideous treatment in an effort to incriminate American personnel or missions. I myself had one who was beaten up terribly in an effort to frame me, and there are many other instances of that sort. Moreover, I have been struck by the fact, learned from my own service behind the Curtain, that we seem to do less than other nations to look after the welfare of these people when they eventually are freed from jail in poor health.

When the State Department hires a person to be a bona fide stenographer or secretary, and they are framed in an effort to incriminate the United States, then I believe we have an obligation. I was wondering if there is legislation which is being proposed calling for repayment of salaries and reimbursement of people who are returned in this condition, and if it is being pushed by the Department.

Secretary RUSK. May I just ask for a complete clarification? You are talking about the national of another country whom we hire in his own country?

Senator PELL. Exactly, for instance a Foreign Service local hired in Poland.

Secretary RUSK. And then the question is, What are we able to do with a person who has been subjected to great hardship, if he leaves Poland?

Senator PELL. No.

Secretary RUSK. You mean upon his return?

Senator PELL. Either in his country or out. For instance, I came across a person the other day who came to me as a Senator, who had been in jail for many years behind the Curtain. She had been a secretary, and she was finally released from jail unfit to work. Her whole crime had been that, in an effort of the authorities to frame her superiors, she was accused of having engaged in espionage.

I asked this woman why she had not gone to the public press about the lack of concern of the U.S. Government for her upon her release. She was a very loyal woman and replied that the reason she had not done so was because it would have disillusioned the people in her country about the United States.

This actually happened, and, therefore, she had never made a public release of her hardship, although the press had urged her to do so.

Secretary RUSK. Let me look into that.

Mr. DUTTON. I can answer that. We are proposing that amendment to the Missing Persons Act, and we believe legislation should

be adopted. The Department has sent it up informally to Senator Cooper and Senator Javits and several others, and it hasn't gotten Budget Bureau clearance.

Senator PELL. I imagine more than any other Senator, I have been exposed to this problem. I remember one such man who did get out and to whom we wouldn't even give a job.

Mr. DUTTON. The woman you mentioned has triggered this whole problem.

Secretary RUSK. We will look into that, and we do have a compassionate responsibility in these situations.

Senator PELL. And a reputation behind the Curtain also.

I have wondered if you have given further thought since both AID and economic offices of the Department come under you, of the idea of encouraging the thought of amalgamating the AID missions with the economic attachés. This was a recommendation Senator Mansfield and several of us made when we came back from our trip last year.

Secretary RUSK. We have done that in about 12 to 15 countries where the embassy personnel are delegated by AID to be the AID officers in particular countries.

Now, I personally think that this is a very useful thing to do, until we reach a point where the additional personnel are needed because the AID program is of sufficient size to require additional personnel, in which case you may have to reinforce it from AID.

But this is a very promising lead, and we have, I think, about a dozen of those in Africa, for example, where the embassy, with no increase in personnel, actually administers an AID program. I think this would have to be looked at on a country-by-country basis, but it is a good idea.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Senator JACKSON. I have another question or two. Senators have been asked to be on the Senate floor at noon in connection with memorial services for President Kennedy.

As we all know, the Government has made much use of the interagency task force as a device for the day-to-day handling of complex and critical national security operations. The interagency task force seems to provide one answer to the problem of coordination, at least for critical issues. But I think the experience has been somewhat mixed. Some have been quite successful, and others possibly not so successful.

I wonder if you might comment briefly on the role of task forces.

Secretary RUSK. First, I think that an interagency task force is almost inevitable where a major and dangerous crisis builds up quickly, and where resources have to be pulled together promptly to advise the Secretary of State, other Cabinet officers, and the President about action that is emerging.

The missile crisis, of course, was where the National Security Council itself became the task force, because of the enormous dangers involved in that situation.

I would not myself like to see standing machinery established which would, in effect, absorb and take the place of all of the task forces, because the difficulty would be that you would have still another piece of machinery that would get in the way of the fast movement of action and policy.

I think we have had mixed experience with this kind of device, as indeed we will have mixed results with policy and action itself. However, we try to keep sufficiently in touch with the other agencies, particularly those members of the National Security Council, on the general flow of our business and in a variety of ways. There is a planning convention each week when the planning community gets together, and there are meetings of various elements of the National Security Council informally at least once a week, and for different purposes. I would think we ought to go at this pretty flexibly and use the task force where it seems necessary, but not to assume that every time there is a problem one has to be organized—and not establish permanent machinery that would take the place of the kind of advice that a President would want in the midst of a fast-moving situation.

If we were to decide as a matter of theory that task forces are not the right answer, we would still have them because any President or Secretary of State is going to pull together people that he wants to have with him in advising him about what ought to be done in a given situation.

Senator JACKSON. If you get too many of them going at once, you have a lot of problems, and you are in trouble.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator JACKSON. Another member requested that I ask this question: A number of U.S. ambassadors have indicated in testimony before this committee that the problem of coordination among Government agencies in Washington, D.C., is rather difficult. In other words, various departments of the Government constantly send out requests to the field and state requirements to our ambassadors.

What is the State Department doing to coordinate, or channel, or screen these requests from the various bureaus and departments of the executive branch, so as to remove any unnecessary burden on our missions abroad?

Secretary RUSK. I would like, if I may, Mr. Chairman, to submit a memorandum on this, because there are different ways in which this is done. The two biggest problems about interdepartmental coordination is first, allocation of short resources among competing demands, and it takes a little effort to get results on that; and secondly, there are genuine conflicts of interest between foreign policy and other matters.

Now, for example, it is not machinery that stands in the way of settling the salinity problem of the Colorado River. It is something much more real than machinery, and yet there is nothing at the moment in our relations with Mexico on which we need coordination better.

I think some of you here at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue know some of the problems of coordination on that particular point, but I would like to submit a little memorandum on this, if I may.

(The memorandum referred to appears as exhibit I on p. 437.)

Senator JACKSON. Dean Acheson, a few years ago, in reflecting on his own experience as Secretary of State spoke of "the emerging future" and said, "The truth is that in foreign affairs man-hours spent in thinking and planning on future action are by far the most profitable investment."

I wonder if you would care to comment on this, and if you have been able to work your setup so that you can sit back and reflect. I thought this would be a good point on which to end the hearing.

Secretary Rusk. I would strongly support what Mr. Acheson said on that point, and I would underline it in relation to our present situation, because I do believe that we are on the front edge of very important changes in the world situation.

It is too early yet to know just how those changes will develop, and in which directions, but the situation is in flux. The problem in front of us now is to find the right line, the sophisticated line, the informed line with naivete and illusion on the one side, and failure to see the possibilities of major changes to the advantage of the free world on the other.

This is a time for thinking and it is hard to get time to think. It is especially hard for the Secretary of State, because in addition to all of the statutory and normal duties that he has, he has a good many representational duties that we haven't mentioned here today. It is a constant struggle.

Senator JACKSON. Fine. And we will hold this hearing record open for a number of other executive branch memorandums which are being submitted at our request as additions to the testimony.

We certainly want to express on behalf of all of the members of the committee our appreciation for your coming here today, and for giving us your comments and your judgment on various matters.

Secretary Rusk. Thank you. It has been very helpful to me.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.)

MEMORANDUM ON THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S POLITICO-MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING

(Prepared in the Office of the Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs)

ORGANIZATION

The Department of State has substantially strengthened its capabilities in the politico-military field during the past 3 years. The Secretary and the other senior officials of the Department have been provided with centralized staff support and functional expertise for dealing with the increasingly wide range of international problems that involve military factors and considerations. At the same time, the geographical and functional bureaus of the Department have strengthened their own staffing and sharpened their own interests in this field.

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs is the senior departmental official with primary staff responsibility for politico-military affairs. He is the focal point for the Department's dealings with the Department of Defense. In May 1961, to assist him in this area, a Politico-Military Affairs staff headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (G/PM) was established as a part of the office of the Deputy Under Secretary. As Secretary Rusk characterized the function in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery in August 1961, the Politico-Military Affairs staff is to—

assist the supervisory level of the State Department in the management and conduct of all the Department's relations with the Department of Defense, including the Military Establishment. It is intended to provide leadership on such matters within the State Department, and thereby enable it to fulfill more effectively its role of providing timely political guidance to other governmental agencies on politico-military matters.¹

The requirement for G/PM and the nature of its role have been stated more recently in the following terms:

Operating in such a setting, the Department needed a unit that could look at politico-military problems on a worldwide basis, assure that regional variations and interrelations had been taken into account, and provide a central point of focus and coordination, as required for the politico-military activities being carried on by the geographical bureaus of the Department. Such a unit would not replace regional politico-military staffs but rather strengthen and tie together their related activities.

There was also a requirement for some State Department unit to review the total U.S. defense effort and the major lines of policy being pursued by the Defense Department in terms of their overall foreign policy implications, and to bring these implications to the attention of the Defense Department where appropriate. In a situation where so many important problems involved the State and Defense Departments, it was also felt that it would be convenient to

¹ U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, "Organizing for National Security," vol. 1, hearings, Aug. 24, 1961, p. 1282.

have one obvious point of contact within the Department well known to all elements of the Department of Defense.²

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs has organized his staff along three major lines of activity. An operations group deals with those military problems that have immediate action consequences or foreign policy implications or foreign policy actions that have military implications and therefore demand coordination and close collaboration with the Defense Department on a current basis. A combined policy staff is concerned with politico-military problems of a policy, planning, and strategic nature. Military aspects of atomic energy and aerospace represent another major area of responsibility. The Deputy Assistant Secretary also has a Special Assistant for Soviet Bloc Politico-Military Affairs. In addition, G/PM has policy guidance and coordinating responsibilities for the Department of State in the fields of emergency preparedness and foreign disaster relief.

On July 1, 1963, the Office of Munitions Control was transferred from the Bureau of Economic Affairs to the jurisdiction of the Deputy Assistant Secretary. The responsibilities of this Office in the licensing of military sales to foreign countries and in monitoring exchange of military information with them are closely related to the activities of the Politico-Military Affairs staff, and this closer relationship seemed desirable.

While the presence of a special staff provides the management/supervisory level of the Department, for the first time, with substantial staff support on politico-military problems, the Deputy Assistant Secretary and his staff by no means represent the totality of the State Department's capabilities in this field. The Department has been involved in politico-military affairs since the end of World War II. Each of the Assistant Secretaries heading the geographical bureaus has officers or staffs charged with full-time responsibilities in this field, and there are, furthermore, few desk officers in these bureaus who do not at one time or another deal with questions of military assistance and training, base rights, overflights of U.S. military aircraft, and visits of U.S. military units or personnel.

In March 1962, as part of an effort to strengthen the Department in the field of Atlantic Community affairs, the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary was established with that responsibility, and the Office of Regional Affairs (RA) in the Bureau of European Affairs was divided into two units, an Office of Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs (RPE) and an Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs (RPM). The latter office provides the primary organizational support in the Department of State for U.S. participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The complex organizational structure of NATO and the intimate interrelations of political and military-strategic problems that characterize its functioning make RPM an extremely busy and important office. The staff of RPM has a close working relationship with G/PM.

In the Inter-American, Near Eastern and South Asian, Far Eastern, and African Affairs Bureaus, there are regional offices that deal with problems that cut across country and subregional lines. Each

² "The Politico-Military Affairs Staff: Its Organization and Its Duties," Department of State Newsletter, No. 30 (October 1963), p. 24. This article provides a detailed description of the organization and functioning of G/PM.

of these offices has a number of officers who devote all or most of their time to such problems as regional security arrangements, military assistance, threats of Communist-inspired insurgency, and related internal security matters.

The Policy Planning Council has a long-standing interest in politico-military problems. In the period before 1961, when the National Security Council machinery was more elaborate than it is at present, the Policy Planning Staff (as it was then called) played a primary role in backstopping the Department of State's participation in the work of the Council. The Planning Council continues to be actively engaged in politico-military problems as an aspect of its long-term planning in the foreign policy field, and its members work with G/PM officers on the politico-military facets of their planning tasks.

In other words, while the Department of State has a number of units to meet a variety of politico-military needs and requirements, these units do not work in isolation from one another. With the support of the Politico-Military Affairs staff, the Deputy Under Secretary coordinates and provides leadership to the politico-military efforts of the geographical and functional bureaus and the Policy Planning Council and works closely with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and relevant geographical and functional units in the Agency for International Development. In addition to the usual working contacts, G/PM officers meet formally once a week with representatives of the politico-military staffs of the Department's geographical bureaus.

A significant portion of the day-to-day politico-military work of the Department is still done in the several regional bureaus. G/PM's significance lies in the fact that it has provided to the component units of the Department of State a central point of functional expertise, leadership, and coordination in this field.

FUNCTIONS

These expanded organizational capabilities have enabled the Department of State to provide clearer guidance and more effective policy direction to those military programs and activities that help implement U.S. foreign policy, for example, stationing of U.S. forces abroad and other military operations overseas, military-strategic planning, and military assistance, training, and equipment sales. At least as noteworthy has been the increasing recognition within the Department that the overall military posture and capabilities of the United States significantly affect the strength and flexibility of its foreign policy and, therefore, that the Department of State must concern itself in a serious and continuing fashion with the military policy decisions that determine what those capabilities will be. The central position of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, supported by the Politico-Military Affairs staff, has enabled him to provide active and positive leadership in these efforts and to mobilize the full politico-military resources of the Department for these purposes.

One example of this relatively new politico-military role is the participation of the Department of State, for the past 3 years, in the Defense Department's annual planning and budget exercise. The Secretary of Defense has now made this a 5-year projection of

strategy and force structure, which is reviewed annually. The relevant documents embody the Defense Department's plans for the future, and the force levels, worldwide force dispositions, and weapons systems development envisaged in them. The Department of State reviews and analyzes these plans and projections from the standpoint of their foreign policy implications and thus permits the Secretary of State to provide appropriate guidance in this field to the Secretary of Defense and advice to the President.

Another field of military activity with which the Department of State now concerns itself on a systematic, continuing basis is deployment of U.S. forces overseas. Because of the relationship between the stationing of large numbers of U.S. troops abroad and the balance-of-payments problem, this has become a particularly sensitive issue during the past year. It is further complicated by the continuing changes in military technology that require or make possible adjustments in the positioning of U.S. forces as between foreign and U.S. bases.

Any redeployments of U.S. forces from overseas bases, or deployments to them, that represent more than the normal rotation of units or individuals are now reviewed as a matter of course by the Department of State to assess likely foreign policy implications. Special interagency coordinating mechanisms have been established, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, to assure effective governmental attention to this complicated problem area. Within the Department of State, G/PM has worked closely with the geographical bureaus whose areas would be affected by proposed redeployments of forces.

There has also been greatly increased collaboration with the Defense Department on a broad range of military contingency planning efforts, special studies, and joint task forces. Major politico-strategic problems in Europe and elsewhere have been the subject of joint review. The Berlin task force is probably the best example of joint contingency planning, but there are others. Cuba and Vietnam have also been approached on an interagency task force basis.

The Cuban crisis of October 1962, and the detailed implementation of the Nassau agreements after December 1962, were marked by the closest State-Defense collaboration in policy development, planning, and execution. In the case of the Nassau agreements, special interagency machinery was established under Department of State chairmanship, with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs heading the effort, for coordination of the detailed and complicated activities involved in translating those agreements into national action. Other areas of the Department played an extensive part in this effort, including the Bureau of European Affairs and the Policy Planning Council.

The Department of State has been active in dealing with politico-military problems at both the nuclear and insurgency-subversion ends of the military spectrum. Under the leadership of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs and his G/PM staff, the Department has attempted to put the problem of Communist subversion and insurgency in its broader political and socio-economic context, to develop increased recognition among the U.S. agencies involved that Communist inspired or supported insurgency is not only or even primarily

a military problem, and to translate that recognition into appropriate policies and programs.

The interdepartmental group that drafted the present U.S. policy doctrine on this subject was chaired by a G/PM officer. The Deputy Under Secretary served from its inception as a member and for a time as chairman for the high-level Special Group (Counter-Insurgency). He in turn has been succeeded by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. The Deputy Under Secretary also served as Chairman of the Interagency Committee on Police Programs that led to a substantial reorganization and strengthening of that effort.

These examples represent major developments and improvements. They are only a very small sample of the wide range of activities carried on by the Department in relation to and collaboration with the Department of Defense.

PERSONNEL IMPROVEMENTS IN WASHINGTON AND OVERSEAS

The strengthening of the Department of State's organizational arrangements in the politico-military field has been accompanied by a planned program to build up within the Department a cadre of officers skilled and experienced in politico-military affairs. The Deputy Under Secretary, the Deputy Assistant Secretary and the G/PM staff have worked very closely with the administrative and personnel organizations of the Department in these efforts.

A number of personnel training and assignment programs are contributing to the result. Among the most important are: the State-Defense officer exchange program initiated at the end of 1960; assignment of State Department personnel to war colleges and other military training institutions as students, faculty, and liaison officers; the political advisers assigned to major U.S. military commands; and the special politico-military Foreign Service officer positions established and being established at many of our overseas missions. All of these are long-term programs, designed to produce an adequate corps of Foreign Service officers and State Department civil servants with politico-military training and operational experience.

Since 1946, more than 425 State Department officers have attended the five U.S. war colleges and the Armed Forces Staff College and equivalent foreign and international defense colleges. In the current 1963-64 school year, there are 15 Foreign Service officers in attendance at the National War College, 3 at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 3 at the Army War College, 3 at the Naval War College, 2 at the Air War College, and 2 at the Armed Forces Staff College. In addition, there are Foreign Service officers attending the Imperial Defence College in London, the Canadian National Defence College, and the NATO Defense College.

There are State Department faculty members at the five U.S. war colleges and the Armed Forces Staff College, a Foreign Service officer on the faculty of the U.S. Air Force Academy and a Foreign Service officer attached as State Department adviser to the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, N.C. Agreement has also been reached for a Foreign Service officer to join the faculty of the U.S. Naval Academy beginning in the summer of 1964. It might also be noted that military officers attend courses at the Foreign Service

Institute, including the senior seminar which is the Foreign Service Institute equivalent of a senior war college course and the interdepartmental seminar on problems of development and internal defense.

The State-Defense officer exchange program initiated in December 1960 is now entering its second round. Most of the State and Defense Department officials who participated in the initial 2-year tours of duty as exchange officers have now completed these tours and returned to their own agencies. It is generally agreed that the program, to this point, has been an outstanding success, and it seems well-established as a long-term arrangement. At this writing, 21 State Department officers are either on duty in the Pentagon or have completed a tour there; the total of military officers and Defense Department civilians in this category is 19. The State Department has attempted to monitor the program very carefully, in terms of the quality of personnel sent to the Defense Department, the positions opened up to the Defense exchange officers, and the follow-on assignments provided to returning State Department exchangees. The Deputy Under Secretary, the Politico-Military Affairs Staff acting on his behalf, and the personnel office of the Department have worked closely together on this problem.

G/PM has provided a "home away from home" for the State Department officials assigned as faculty members at the war colleges and as political advisers (POLADS) to major military commanders. A POLAD is defined as--

a Foreign Service officer who has been assigned to the staff of a U.S. unified or specified military commander on the basis of formal agreement between the Departments of State and Defense and who is responsible solely to the commander.

* * * * *

The POLAD is not an institutional representative of the Department of State nor is he a Department of State liaison officer serving with the command.

The function of the POLAD is to advise and consult with the commander on political, politico-military and economic matters affecting the commander's theater of operations. In performing this function, he provides a specialized expertise and source of information to the commander in the same way as any other special staff officer.*

There are at present eight designated positions as POLAD's, all filled by senior Foreign Service officers. They are located at the following military commands: European Command; Pacific Command; Atlantic Command; Southern Command (Canal Zone); Strategic Air Command; Strike Command; Military Air Transport Service; and U.S. High Commissioner, Ryukyus.

The Department has been actively engaged in strengthening the POLAD program. The goal has been to upgrade qualitatively the personnel assigned to these jobs by selecting, through an exhaustive review process, officers with the stature, background, and experience which would enable them to function effectively as senior advisers to key commanders.

The POLAD's represent one effort to strengthen politico-military collaboration and staffing in the field. In oversea diplomatic missions where there are important military problems confronting the ambassador, Foreign Service officers with the necessary politico-military

* "POLAD's Role With the Military," Department of State Newsletter, No. 31 (November 1963), pp. 7 and 30.

background and experience are now being assigned to political sections or as special assistants and advisers to the ambassadors in this field. There are considerable variations in title, job description, and actual functioning, but the essential purpose is to strengthen the ambassador's ability to integrate effectively the military aspects of country team activities. In one recent case, a Foreign Service officer who had just completed a 2-year tour in the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the exchange program was sent to a key post in southeast Asia as politico-military special assistant to the ambassador. It is anticipated that this will be an increasingly typical assignment pattern, following up an exchange position in the Defense Department with some closely related oversea or Washington assignment. Along somewhat similar lines, a senior Foreign Service officer who had been on the G/PM staff has been transferred to Embassy London as counselor for politico-military affairs.

Another device that is being experimented with as a means of improving communication and understanding about major politico-military problems between Washington and oversea missions is the regional conference of embassy politico-military officials and responsible State and Defense officials from Washington. The first of these conferences—a 3-day session involving embassy politico-military officers and POLAD's in Europe and devoted to a broad but intensive review of existing and anticipated politico-military problems affecting the U.S. Government—took place in Paris in October 1962. It proved highly successful. A similar politico-military conference will be held in Europe sometime early in 1964 and in the Far East sometime later in the year. Thought is also being given to holding such conferences in other regional areas, depending upon the availability of funds.

THE FUTURE

It should not be inferred that the Department of State has perfected its organization and skills for these difficult and challenging politico-military tasks, or that the State and Defense Departments have developed a fully satisfactory basis for their multiple and complex relationships. It is clear that the range of foreign policy problems and relations with foreign nations affected in one way or another by military decisions and activities is broadening rather than narrowing. The Department of State's politico-military competence must, as consequence, continue to be strengthened. The personnel programs noted above do provide the basis for keeping abreast of this substantial and expanding challenge.

In order to discharge its leadership and coordinating responsibilities in the foreign policy field, the Department of State should be in a position to formulate specific policy guidance within which the Department of Defense can develop its detailed military programs as well as to advise the Defense Department on the foreign policy implications of proposed military policies and actions. This implies substantial, continuing involvement with military policies and problems and increasing ability to analyze and assess them in broader national policy terms. It also implies increased organizational and personnel resources devoted to this area, and continuing experimentation with the most effective institutional arrangements for doing the job.

**BUREAU OF THE BUDGET STAFF MEMORANDUM ON
IMPROVEMENTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY ADMIN-
ISTRATION**

(With transmittal letter by the Honorable Kermit Gordon, Director)

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET,
Washington, D.C., December 23, 1963.

Hon. HENRY M. JACKSON,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Opera-
tions, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, Wash-
ington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR JACKSON: As you requested, I am enclosing a staff memorandum on some recent efforts toward the improvement of national security administration in which the Bureau of the Budget has participated. In view of the subcommittee's attention to "communications and the national security policy process," the first two items in this statement—the National Communications System and foreign affairs information management—may be of special interest.

Also included is a brief discussion of a problem which the Secretary of State has discussed with your subcommittee—the growing number and diversity of the oversea activities of both foreign affairs and domestic agencies. The memorandum contains an explanation of an approach to this problem which we are now attempting to work out with the State Department.

I hope that our comments will be of use to you in your continuing studies of national security operations. If you desire additional information or assistance, please do not hesitate to call on us.

Sincerely,

KERMIT GORDON, *Director.*

**BUREAU OF THE BUDGET STAFF MEMORANDUM ON IMPROVEMENTS IN
NATIONAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION**

The Bureau of the Budget, in carrying out its responsibilities for budgetary and management improvement matters, has participated in a number of efforts to improve the administration of national security and other foreign affairs activities. Following is a brief discussion of three subjects in this area with which the Bureau has recently been concerned.

1. *National Communications System.*—On July 11, 1963, President Kennedy issued a national security action memorandum (NSAM) directing that a National Communications System (NCS) be "established and developed by linking together, improving, and extending on an evolutionary basis the communications facilities and components of the various Federal agencies." (An unclassified version of this NSAM, signed by the President August 18, is attached.)

The establishment of the NCS is intended to ensure that the President and other key civil and military officials will have reliable, fast, secure, and survivable communications in all cases, including nuclear attack and other national emergencies. It is also expected that savings will be realized in the unit cost of information transmitted, and that technological advances in communications will be fully exploited to the benefit of all user agencies.

Creation of the NCS can be viewed as the latest step in a continuing effort to improve the organization and management of Federal Government communications. There have been two principal precursors to the NCS, both of which are now incorporated into it: The Defense Communications System (DCS) and the Federal Telecommunications System (FTS). The first was established by the Secretary of Defense in 1960 to serve the needs of the Defense Department and is administered by the Defense Communications Agency. The second was established in the General Services Administration to serve civil agencies in the United States pursuant to instructions of President Eisenhower in January 1961.

Evolution toward a unified national communications system was accelerated by the Cuban crisis, which revealed a number of significant deficiencies in national security communications. At the very beginning of that emergency, President Kennedy charged a task force headed by William H. Orrick, Jr., then Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, with providing for the creation of a national communications system which would make U.S. worldwide communications as prompt, reliable, and secure as possible. The Orrick committee brought about many significant improvements on an ad hoc basis. At the same time the Bureau of the Budget, working closely with the Orrick committee, undertook to consider alternative means of organizing a national communications system to attain the President's longer-term communications objectives.

Principal elements of the NCS are the DCS and FTS, mentioned above, and other civil agency communications, including NASA, FAA, and the diplomatic communications of the Department of State. The NCS will include all point-to-point telecommunications facilities owned or leased by the Federal Government which are necessary to meet national security needs either in peacetime or in a national emergency.

The President's NSAM of July 11, assigns responsibility for NCS policy direction and requirements determination to the Director of Telecommunications Management (DTM) whose position was established by Executive Order 10995 of February 16, 1962. Placing these functions in the Executive Office of the President was considered appropriate to the role of the DTM and to the need for coordination and supervision of the integration of the Government's major telecommunications systems.

To underscore the President's interest in national security communications, the DTM was given a second title, that of Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications. Since the DTM's post is now vacant, Jerome B. Wiesner, Director of the Office of Science and Technology, is acting as Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications.

Designing the NCS to satisfy approved requirements is the task of the Secretary of Defense, as "Executive Agent." To aid him as

Executive Agent, the Secretary has designated Mr. Solis Horwitz, Director of the Office of Organizational and Management Planning, as his Assistant for NCS matters. Lt. Gen. Alfred D. Starbird (USA), Director, Defense Communications Agency, has been designated Manager, NCS.

The Manager, NCS has already completed a detailed inventory of all Federal Government point-to-point communications networks to determine which should be initially included in the NCS. Based on this inventory and the communications requirements submitted by the NCS agencies, the Manager, NCS, has completed near-term planning for the NCS. Work has begun on the first NCS long-range plan, which will be submitted to the President next April.

2. *Foreign Affairs Information Management.*—The problem of “national security communications” involves such functions as the distribution and control of information conveyed by a communication system as well as the facilities, equipment, and technical procedures used to convey it. Particular emphasis has recently been given to the information processes of the Department of State.

There is growing recognition that the State Department cannot adequately fulfill its essential leadership role in national security affairs if it does not improve its “information management”; i.e., its system of collecting and processing data, screening and converting these data into information relevant to national security decision-making, and disseminating the information to users (in and out of State) on a timely basis. Since State’s leadership role must be founded upon effective interagency relationships, the technical characteristics and scope of the system must take into account the systems used by other agencies. Thus, any advanced system developed by State should be technically compatible with the existing and planned systems of other agencies in the national security field, primarily the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. Its scope must comprehend not only the type of information traditionally generated and used by State, but also that generated and used by other foreign affairs agencies with which the State Department interchanges substantial quantities of information. Whether an even broader scope might be required—such as a “National Security Information System” serving common information needs of all the national security agencies—is dependent on the outcome of current planning efforts discussed below.

The Bureau’s assistance in dealing with State’s information management problem was requested by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Management in May 1963. As a result of this request, an exploratory review of current information handling activities was conducted by a joint Bureau of the Budget/State Department group. Although this review concentrated on the traditional elements of the State Department, it included limited discussions with officials of AID, USIA, ACDA, the Defense Department, and CIA.

A number of deficiencies in information management in the State Department have been revealed. Among these deficiencies are: inadequate definition of reporting requirements; unnecessary duplication of documents and files; lack of an effective mechanism for controlling the flow of information between the point of acquisition and the end user; lack of a common data base and classification code to facilitate interchange of information between State and other agencies.

Such deficiencies stem from a variety of factors: the difficulty of securing personnel who are expert both in foreign affairs and in information systems work; the subtle and subjective nature of much foreign affairs data; and the severe budgetary limitations imposed on the Department by the Congress. As a result of the deficiencies identified, the typical consumer of information gets a great deal of information that he does not need. A more serious result of inadequate information management is that all too often consumers of information may not receive all the information that they really need and when they do receive it, it may sometimes be too late to make full use of it. Some efforts to improve various aspects of this situation have been undertaken in the State Department; however, the joint study clearly revealed that a comprehensive approach to the problem is now required.

The Bureau and the State Department have concluded that a staff group of skilled professional employees and consultants should be established in State to develop an approach and action plan to improve foreign affairs information management. Consideration is being given to including in the President's budget for fiscal year 1965 funds to support this program.

The first, and probably most crucial, step in the action plan would be the identification, validation and definition of each user's requirement for foreign affairs information. Requirements for key officials would be stated as precisely as possible, in order to permit the preparation of a "profile of interest" for each official. This would be followed by a review of current information handling practices and development of a system design. Such a system design would provide for phased evolutionary improvements in existing practices, looking toward the ultimate establishment of an advanced information system.

3. *Guidelines for International Activities.*—Before World War II, the foreign activities of the United States were limited substantially to those involved in traditional diplomatic exchange. These activities were carried out almost exclusively by Foreign Service officers who served not only the State Department but also the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. During the postwar period the character of our activities overseas has diversified and changed. Extensive military and foreign aid commitments were undertaken. A large information program was initiated and many "domestic" agencies found it necessary to station personnel abroad. The expanded role of the United States in the world has placed extensive burdens on the Ambassador and on the State Department. Not the least of these burdens is the need to review, coordinate, and assess the foreign policy implications of, the overseas efforts of almost 30 separate agencies of the U.S. Government.

It is our belief that some guidelines on oversea activities are necessary to assist in making decisions on the assignment of functions by statute and Executive orders; in the examination of competing requirements among foreign affairs programs; in the evaluation of programs to be carried out at home or abroad; and in the general formulation of the President's budget. To facilitate these objectives, the Bureau of the Budget has been attempting to develop, in consultation with the State Department, a framework for reviewing the activities of the various agencies overseas.

Within this framework, a distinction would be made between those activities which contribute directly to the foreign policy objectives of the United States and those activities which are carried out overseas in order to support an agency's domestic mission. The technical assistance functions carried out by a number of agencies are examples of activities in the first category. The functions performed overseas by offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Veterans' Administration are examples of the latter type of activity.

We are considering arrangements under which so-called domestic agencies will be expected to enter into agreements with the State Department or another foreign affairs agency with respect to the scope and level of foreign affairs activities which the domestic agencies are to perform. The budgets for such activities which support foreign affairs programs would be submitted to the appropriate foreign affairs agency for review of the proposed staffing and program funding levels. An agreed-to statement of justification would be submitted along with the estimate to the Bureau of the Budget. All annual and supplemental requests would be handled in a similar manner.

The programs that are carried out overseas in direct support of an agency's domestic mission would not need to be approved by a foreign affairs agency and would be justified as a regular part of the agency's programs. The Department of State would, however, be asked to raise objections regarding the foreign policy implications of these programs, where appropriate. This system should also facilitate the general coordination responsibilities of the Ambassador by permitting him to comment on proposed programs as a part of the State Department review. Such advance knowledge of developing programs would be helpful to him in his forward planning for operations within his assigned country.

This approach would be only a first step toward improving the classification and review of international activities. It should, however, help to improve the effectiveness of the budget process with respect to the overseas activities of the Federal Government and should also provide the Secretary of State with a useful "action forcing process" in his role as the President's "agent of coordination" in foreign affairs.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, August 21, 1963.

Memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies.
Subject: Establishment of the National Communications System.

CONCEPT AND OBJECTIVES

In order to strengthen the communications support of all major functions of Government there is need to establish a unified governmental communications system which will be called the National Communications System (NCS). It shall be established and developed by linking together, improving, and extending on an evolutionary basis the communications facilities and components of the various Federal agencies.

The objective of the NCS will be to provide necessary communications for the Federal Government under all conditions ranging from a normal situation to national emergencies and international crises, including nuclear attack. The system will be developed and operated to be responsive to the variety of needs of the national command and user agencies and be capable of meeting priority requirements under emergency or war conditions through use of reserve capacity and additional private facilities. The NCS will also provide the necessary

combinations of hardness, mobility, and circuit redundancy to obtain survivability of essential communications in all circumstances.

Initial emphasis in developing the NCS will be on meeting the most critical needs for communications in national security programs, particularly to overseas areas. As rapidly as is consistent with meeting critical needs, other Government needs will be examined and satisfied, as warranted, in the context of the NCS. The extent and character of the system require careful consideration in light of the priorities of need, the benefits to be obtained, and the costs involved.

Although no complete definition of the National Communications System can be made in advance of design studies and evolution in practice, it is generally conceived that the National Communications System would be comprised primarily of the long haul, point-to-point, trunk communications which can serve one or more agencies.

The President has directed the following organizational arrangements relating to the establishment and effective operation of the NCS.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE RESPONSIBILITIES

In carrying out his functions pursuant to Executive Orders 10705 and 10995 and under this memorandum, the Director of Telecommunications Management shall be responsible for policy direction of the development and operation of a National Communications System. In this capacity, he shall also serve as a Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications and shall—

(a) Advise with respect to communication requirements to be supplied through the National Communications System; the responsibilities of the agencies in implementing and utilizing the National Communications System; the guidance to be given to the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for the National Communications System with respect to the design and operation of the National Communications System; and the adequacy of system designs developed by the Executive Agent to provide, on a priority basis and under varying conditions of emergency, communications to the users of the National Communications System.

(b) Identify those requirements unique to the needs of the Presidency.

(c) Formulate and issue to the Executive Agent guidance as to the relative priorities of requirements.

(d) Exercise review and surveillance of actions to insure compliance with policy determinations and guidance.

(e) Insure that there is adequate planning to meet future needs of the National Communications System.

(f) Assist the President with respect to his coordinating and other functions under the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 as may be specified by Executive order or otherwise.

In performing these functions, the Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications will work closely with the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; he will consult with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, as appropriate; will establish arrangements for interagency consultation to insure that the National Communications System will meet the essential needs of all Government agencies; and will be responsible for carrying on the work of the Subcommittee on Communications of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council which is hereby abolished. In addition to staff regularly assigned, he is authorized to arrange for the assignment of communications and other specialists from any agency by detail or temporary assignment.

The Bureau of the Budget, in consultation with the Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications, the Executive Agent, and the Administrator of General Services, will prescribe general guidelines and procedures for reviewing the financing of the National Communications System within the budgetary process and for preparation of budget estimates by the participating agencies.

EXECUTIVE AGENT RESPONSIBILITIES

To obtain the benefits of unified technical planning and operations, a single Executive Agent for the National Communications System is necessary. The President has designated the Secretary of Defense to serve in this capacity. He shall—

(a) Design, for the approval of the President, the National Communications System, taking into consideration the communication needs and resources of all Federal agencies.

(b) Develop plans for fulfilling approved requirements and priority determinations, and recommend assignments of implementation responsibilities to user agencies.

(c) Assist the user agencies and the General Services Administrator with respect to the Federal Telecommunications System to accomplish their respective undertakings in the development and operation of the system.

(d) Allocate, reallocate, and arrange for restoration of communications facilities to authorized users based on approved requirements and priorities.

(e) Develop operational plans and provide operational guidance with respect to all elements of the National Communications System, including: (1) The prescription of standards and practices as to operation, maintenance, and installation; (2) the maintenance of necessary records to insure effective utilization of the National Communications System; (3) the request of assignments of radio frequencies for the National Communications System; (4) the monitoring of frequency utilization; and (5) the exercise and test of system effectiveness.

(f) Within general policy guidance, carry on long-range planning to insure the National Communications System meets future Government needs, especially in the national security area, and conduct and coordinate research and development in support of the National Communications System to insure that the National Communications System reflects advancements in the art of communications.

The Secretary of Defense may delegate these functions within the Department of Defense subject at all times to his direction, authority, and control. In carrying out his responsibilities for design, development, and operation of the National Communications System, the Secretary will make appropriate arrangements for participation of staff of other agencies.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES

The Federal Telecommunications System, established with the approval of the President under authority of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, to provide communications services to certain agencies in the 50 States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, shall be a part of the National Communications System and shall be implemented and developed in accordance with approved plans and policies developed pursuant to this memorandum. The Executive Agent and the Administrator of General Services shall be responsible for establishing arrangements to avoid duplication in requests for cost, traffic, and other information needed from agencies served by the Federal Telecommunications System.

Nothing contained herein shall affect the responsibilities of the Administrator of General Services under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, with respect to the representation of agencies in negotiations with carriers and in proceedings before Federal and State regulatory bodies; prescription of policies and methods of procurement; and the procurement either directly or by delegation of authority to other agencies of public utility communications services.

AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES

All agencies are directed by the President to cooperate with and assist the Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications, the Executive Agent, and the Administrator of General Services in the performance of the functions set forth above.

This memorandum shall be published in the Federal Register.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON AND THE HONORABLE DONALD M. WILSON, ACTING DIRECTOR, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY, AND THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P. BUNDY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
STAFFING AND OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C., November 1, 1963.

Hon. EDWARD R. MURROW,
*Director, U.S. Information Agency,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. MURROW: As you know, the Senate has given our subcommittee the task of reviewing the administration of national security in Washington and in the field, and of making suggestions for improvement where appropriate. Our approach to this task is professional and nonpartisan.

From the start of our inquiry we have been concerned with certain basic problems of coordinating national security policy and operations.

As part of our inquiry, we would greatly appreciate a statement from you on some of the key issues of our study. With your special experience and perspective, I believe that you could make a most important contribution to our thinking.

We have in mind that your views would be particularly helpful on the following topics:

1. The present administration has made much use of the interagency task force as a device for the day-to-day handling of complex and critical operations. The interagency task force seems to provide one answer to the problem of coordination, at least for critical issues. But the experience has been mixed. Some have been successful; others have been disappointing. The record is extensive enough so that it should be possible to find out why one works but not another.

We would welcome any comments you may have as the result of your experience on what distinguishes the more successful task force from the less successful, using examples, if possible, although our interest is of course in the procedural and not the substantive aspects of task force operations.

2. The enormous growth of U.S. oversea programs since 1942 and the division of authority among departments and agencies in Washington has produced large-scale problems of coordination in the field. The historical record indicates a long struggle to put the Ambassador in the driver's seat in U.S. missions abroad.

President Kennedy's letter of May 29, 1961, is the most recent action to confirm the Ambassador's authority.

We would welcome any comments you may have on what distinguishes the more successful country team operation from the less successful.

In general, in other words, we would appreciate your evaluation of what steps might be taken to improve interagency planning and coordination in Washington and in the field.

I am enclosing a copy of our initial staff report entitled "Basic Issues," together with the subcommittee's hearings to date, which indicate the kinds of problems we have been examining.

It would be most helpful to us if we could have your statement by December 1, together with any materials you might wish to include with it, so that we can benefit from its study during this part of our inquiry, and include it in our formal record.

With appreciation for your help in this matter,
Sincerely yours,

HENRY M. JACKSON,*
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations.

NOTE.—A similar letter was addressed to the Honorable William P. Bundy.

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, D.C., December 2, 1963.

Hon. HENRY M. JACKSON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR JACKSON: I am happy to respond to your request of November 7, as originally embodied in your letter to Mr. Murrow of November 1.

You ask specifically for our views on what distinguishes the successful interagency task force from the less successful, and the successful country team from the less successful.

In your initial staff report "Basic Issues," of January 18, 1963, the term "interagency task force" is used to encompass a variety of interdepartmental committees, ranging from groups dealing at the highest level with a single highly critical issue to those constituted to engage broader problems over a continuing time.

For the purposes of my comments, I should like to separate the temporary ad hoc task force from the continuing group, whether it be known as task force, working group, or interagency committee.

THE AD HOC TASK FORCE

In my opinion, the ad hoc task force is a successful procedural device when it meets the following criteria:

(1) The issue at hand has a degree of criticality requiring attention at the decisionmaking level. It follows that representation from all agencies and departments concerned must be at a high level. This does not preclude the use of interagency subgroups for integrated staff work at one or even two lower levels.

ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

431

(2) The ad hoc task force must exist only so long and meet only so often as the unfolding situation requires. When conditions permit, it should be disbanded as quickly and definitively as it was formed, and its responsibilities returned to normal channels.

(3) The task, the authorities, and the limitations of the task force must be defined with precision, as well as the line of report up and the line of execution down. Failure to define the task, authorities, and limitations may lead to indirection. Imprecision in the line of report up may delay critical decisions. Failure in execution may negate sound decisions.

The less successful task force is, conversely, the one lacking these characteristics in whole or in part.

I would cite the Berlin Task Force as an example of both the successful and less successful aspects.

The Berlin Task Force was convened at a critical time, and met the criteria described above. However, when the critical phase of the confrontation was passed, it was not disbanded. Because it continued to exist in name, agency and departmental officials continued to be specifically assigned to the task force after it ceased to be a full-time job. (At one time USIA had two high-ranking officers assigned full time to the Berlin Task Force, later one, and subsequently the work became a part-time responsibility of our desk officer for German and Austrian affairs.) More important, there was confusion over where responsibility for Berlin rested, with the task force or the appropriate area and country offices. In my opinion, the Berlin Task Force should have been formally dissolved and its responsibilities returned to the regular organization.

From our point of view there are two clear conclusions: the device of ad hoc task forces should be used sparingly, and such arrangements should be dissolved formally as soon as conditions permit.

CONTINUING INTERAGENCY COMMITTEES

The characteristics of the successful continuing interagency committee, whether formalized by Executive order or ad hoc, are similar to the task force but vary in degree:

(1) By definition, its work involves a longer time frame. Not all of its policy determinations nor actions have the same degree of urgency, and can be studied and resolved at a more deliberate pace. A high official can chair or participate in several such groups without undue sacrifice to his other duties. More of the basic work can and should be undertaken at staff levels for final action at a higher level.

(2) A high level of participation is desirable, but not essential. High-level chairmanship, not lower than an Assistant Secretary of State or the equivalent, is nevertheless essential. A chairman at that level is able to effect a response from other agencies and departments, even though the latter's participants in the group itself may not be able to speak with final authority. An example of this is the Latin American Policy Committee, which has been a singularly effective body since it was set up.

I am generally opposed to interagency committees below that level (unless they function as a subgroup to a higher level committee) for two reasons: (a) issues capable of resolution or coordination at that

level can normally be resolved or coordinated through the existing executive structure; (b) groups operating well below the decision-making level tend to become discussion societies. Their written products, if any, seldom reach the decision stage.

The vast bulk of our interagency business, at all levels, is done in regular and more or less traditional channels, day after day, week after week.

(3) High-level interest in any successful continuing interagency committee must be sustained. If the representation becomes progressively lower and, worse, if the chairing is left to deputies or assistants, the inevitable tendency is to turn prime attention to what appears to be more pressing business. This is in direct contradistinction to the task force. The problem of the continuing committee is to sustain interest in, and to galvanize the resources of the Government to deal with, stubborn, often perplexing problems which may be with us for years.

I would cite as an example of a successful continuing group the Inter-Agency Committee on Youth and Student Affairs. This Committee was established on an ad hoc basis to deal with what the Kennedy administration recognized as a specific, continuing, and growing problem—the widespread anti-American and/or pro-Communist orientation of youth and students in many nonbloc countries. The Committee is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. Its interest and the interest of other agencies at a high level has been sustained. The results have been substantially stepped up and better coordinated U.S. programs for youth and students abroad, continuing attention to countries where students are an important political factor, assignment of additional student affairs officers overseas, specific coordination of activities within most U.S. missions under a designated coordinator for youth and student activities, and widespread recognition in all affected agencies that this administration is determined to continue the effort as long as necessary. The problem is by no means solved—the program may have to be continued for years—but the machinery to grapple with it is functioning.

From our point of view these conclusions may be drawn: (1) The device of a continuing interagency committee should also be used sparingly. (2) Its assignment must be of such proportions as to require high-level attention over a considerable timespan. (3) Its area of activity, its authority, and its limitations must be capable of fairly precise definition. (4) The chairmanship must be at a sufficiently high level to induce adequate responses from participating agencies. (5) Interest must be sustained.

THE COUNTRY TEAM

My evaluation of the country team operation is based in part on direct observation of our field activities, in part on the reports of my senior colleagues and USIA assistant directors who spend much of their time in the field directly supervising our USIS missions.

I am convinced that the success or failure of the country team concept depends primarily on the personality, executive methods, and interests of the chief of mission. Some Ambassadors use the country team effectively as such. Others accomplish the purposes embodied in

the concept by other means, but still maintain purposeful and coordinated general direction of all programs within their country of assignment. Still others pay service to the concept without achieving central general direction or adequate coordination.

To a lesser extent, the success of the country team concept depends on the capability of the team members and—perhaps even more importantly—their willingness to cooperate positively in a coordinated program. Ultimately, Ambassadors have the authority to extract this coordination, but they are generally loath to force an issue that stops short of documented insubordination or malfeasance.

USIA strongly favors the country team concept, and active participation by the chief of mission in public affairs programs. An interested and articulate ambassador, skilled in public affairs, is a prime asset for any oversea information program. Close cooperation is not only desirable, it is essential; lack of it may be disastrous in the public affairs field.

Fortunately, the utility of the public affairs tool is today widely recognized by U.S. chiefs of mission, and is becoming more so.

We believe that the authorities of the chief of mission, specifically as delineated by the letter of the President to American Ambassadors on May 29, 1961, together with the President's statement of mission to USIA of January 25, 1963, adequately define our mutual relationship in the field. We acknowledge the primacy of the Ambassador without reservation; we also expect to carry out effectively our role as public relations counselor to him and other members of the country team.

We agree, as your committee study Basic Issues points out, that there are limitations on the Ambassador's powers, particularly in budgeting and programing. In the case of USIA, the allocation of resources country by country and area by area must, of course, rest with the Director of USIA. Yet the ambassador can influence this decision. When it comes to the allocation within his country of the available resources, he has great influence; depending on his interest, he will have much to say in the allocation of money and manpower by media, press versus radio or TV, for example, and in the selection of audiences we attempt to reach, for example the relative emphasis on the ruling elite, labor, youth and students, or whatever sources of influence he deems important. Here, if he desires, the determinations of the Ambassador may approach the decisive for USIA programs. I believe the same is true, or at least could be true, in the relative allocation of various forms of aid within his country, military versus economic, technical versus budgetary. If he desires, the Ambassador can exert a dominant influence on the cultural program; for example, selection of exchangees and performing artists.

In addition to our comments on the specific points above, you asked generally what steps might be taken to improve interagency planning and coordination in Washington and the field.

I believe the new USIA statement of mission from President Kennedy in his memorandum to Mr. Murrow of January 25 goes far to sharpen the role of the Information Agency vis-a-vis other elements of the Government. The public relations counseling role spelled out there is of great importance and has been fully recognized by the

administration, both in word and practice. I attach a copy of the memorandum for the information of the committee.

In our view, the area now needing most urgent attention is integrated field planning. Current plans of operating agencies and departments in individual countries must be even more closely meshed. Procedures for projections, which for several agencies are based on a 5-year cycle, must be meshed to achieve integration and avoid duplication in reporting. In cooperation with other agencies, the State Department is currently engaged with this problem, and we are hopeful of tangible and constructive results.

If you or members of your subcommittee have further questions, I would be happy to submit whatever additional information we may have.

Sincerely,

DONALD M. WILSON,
Acting Director.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, January 25, 1963.

Memorandum for the Director, U.S. Information Agency.

The mission of the U.S. Information Agency is to help achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations, and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies, programs, and official statements.

The influencing of attitudes is to be carried out by overt use of the various techniques of communication—personal contact, radio broadcasting, libraries, book publication and distribution, press, motion pictures, television, exhibits, English-language instruction, and others. In so doing, the Agency shall be guided by the following:

1. Individual country programs should specifically and directly support country and regional objectives determined by the President and set forth in official policy pronouncements, both classified and unclassified.

2. Agency activities should (a) encourage constructive public support abroad for the goal of a "peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others"; (b) identify the United States as a strong, democratic, dynamic nation qualified for its leadership of world efforts toward this goal, and (c) unmask and counter hostile attempts to distort or frustrate the objectives and policies of the United States. These activities should emphasize the ways in which U.S. policies harmonize with those of other peoples and governments, and those aspects of American life and culture which facilitate sympathetic understanding of U.S. policies.

The advisory function is to be carried out at various levels in Washington, and within the country team at U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. While the Director of the U.S. Information Agency shall take the initiative in offering counsel when he deems it advisable, the various departments and agencies should seek such counsel when considering policies and programs which may substantially affect or be

affected by foreign opinion. Consultation with the U.S. Information Agency is essential when programs affecting communications media in other countries are contemplated.

U.S. Information Agency staffs abroad, acting under the supervision of the chiefs of mission, are responsible for the conduct of overt public information, public relations, and cultural activities—that is, those activities intended to inform or influence foreign public opinion—for agencies of the U.S. Government except for commands of the Department of Defense.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., December 27, 1963.

HON. HENRY M. JACKSON,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR JACKSON: I apologize for my delay in responding to your letter of November 1. As I am sure you know, this has been a hectic period.

You raised two key questions: What makes a good (or bad) inter-agency task force here in Washington, and what makes a good (or bad) country team operation in the field?

My answer on both counts is, on reflection, as simple to enunciate as it is sometimes difficult to execute. It comes down to two things; first, a clear definition of responsibility, and second, the personal effectiveness of the man in charge. The definition of responsibility for the country team is, in my judgment, as clear as it can ever be made, in the form of the President's letter of May 29, 1961. The concept of effective country team operation thus defined requires that the Ambassador exercise the power thus conferred on him. Where he does so, the country team operation is effective. Where he is reluctant to assume the authority that he must assume for matters cutting across agency jurisdictions—for example, the U.S. position with respect to local defense budgets, involving in major cases both AID funds and military assistance assumptions—the recommendations of the country team suffer and we in Washington fail to get a true picture. However, having taken that particular example, I would go on to say that the performance of our Ambassadors in the key countries thus affected, notably Greece, Turkey, Korea, and South Vietnam, has seemed to me to be of a very high order.

In the case of the interagency task force here in Washington, the problem of definition of responsibility is sometimes more acute. Almost necessarily, such a task force operates on the basis that its conclusions will have to be cleared at the top level in the relevant departments. It may in practice be reporting, in effect, to the Secretary of State or in a few instances it may be reporting to the National Security Council, or the executive committee of the National Security Council, and thus, in effect, to the President. The main thing is to be clear which, so that the task force operates as a final staff operation within the Government. As a rough generalization, I would say that task forces have been effective where they knew flatly to whom they were reporting, and for what decisions, and where—to refer again to my

second criterion—the chairman of the task force was prepared to assume personal responsibility for the result.

This is about as far as I can take the subject as a matter of concept. I am well aware that these criteria are hardly novel, but I doubt very much if one could draw up any additional ones that would not be subject to so many exceptions and variations of circumstance that they would in the end not be helpful.

It is of course axiomatic in the above that on any major foreign policy question the State Department is the President's senior adviser. Its representative should chair interagency task forces, just as its ambassador, or rather the President's ambassador, heads the country team. I can assure you that we in the Defense Department, both in the Office of the Secretary and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, fully understand and operate under this basic principle. Many questions are, of course, so intermixed with military considerations that it is appropriate for us both to present our views strongly as to the final course to be followed and, on occasion, to indicate to higher authority a difference of view with the State Department or the ambassador. Such differences are provided for under existing procedures and may be resolved between the Secretaries of State and Defense personally, by consultation involving other departments, or in the last analysis by the President himself. But failing such appeal to higher authority, we in this Department accept unquestioningly the principle of the primacy of the Department of State, both here and in the field.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM P. BUNDY.

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT I

COORDINATION AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL

(Comment submitted by Secretary Rusk)

The Department's standing orders require that requests to field posts for reports from the Foreign Service, whether they originate in the Department or elsewhere, be channeled through or cleared with designated units.

The bulk of the Foreign Service's reporting for other agencies concerns economic or economic-related data. Requests for such reports (as well as similar requests from within the Department) must be submitted to the foreign reporting staff in the Bureau of Economic Affairs. This staff screens, coordinates, and schedules requirements on the field. Through scrupulous examination and subsequent interagency negotiations the schedule for recurring reports has been rigorously limited to the most fundamental needs of Washington agencies. The staff is now attempting to apply the same degree of professional scrutiny to day-to-day unscheduled requests.

Requests to posts for administrative reports are cleared in advance with the regional bureau or bureaus concerned. Recurring and scheduled administrative reports are also cleared in advance with the regulations and procedures staff in the Bureau of Administration; requests for one-time reports are post-audited by the regulations and procedures staff. The need for all administrative requests are evaluated against detailed, prescribed criteria covering purpose, essentiality, frequency, coverage, simplicity, and post-workload.

Requests for political reporting by the Foreign Service generally originate within the regional bureaus, or in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. All requests are screened by the regional bureaus routinely at the desk officer and office director level, or at a higher level if the situation warrants. The basic problem in political reporting is not one of coordination. Rather it concerns the nature of the political reporting function as it affects both Washington and field posts, and of the interrelationship of certain specialized reporting activities—areas which have been under study by the Department and which have been recognized by the subcommittee in its basic issues study.

In addition to requirements on the Foreign Service, which are controlled as previously described, some requests are made directly by departments and agencies to such separate staffs as they may be authorized to maintain overseas. Agencies with important operating programs overseas, such as AID or USIA, send a continual flow of requests to their own oversea employees. Where subject-matter coordination is required, Washington clearances are obtained from State regional bureaus, generally at the desk officer or office director level. This is not, however, a screening process in terms of workload; such agencies are assumed to have exercised their responsibility for tailoring their requirements to the capacities of their own oversea staff. Active efforts are being made, however, in both the economic and administrative areas to gear more closely requirements placed through State on the Foreign Service with those made by other agencies on their own oversea staffs.

* * * * *

In the larger framework of interagency policy and program coordination the Department has taken a number of steps. For example, regional interdepartmental policy committees have been established for Latin America and Africa; these are chaired by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State with representation from other agencies and the White House at approximately the same

level. In the field of international aviation, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs chairs an Interagency Committee on International Aviation Policy, and a Coordinator of International Aviation has been appointed to direct development and coordination of international aviation policy for the U.S. Government. In the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Department has, for a number of years, had an effective focus where specific political and military matters could be looked at in terms of their interrelationships and within the totality of foreign policy. The Department is now developing organizational changes to strengthen relationships with other agencies on matters of administration; including review by the Department (at the request of the Bureau of the Budget) of other agencies' budget proposals for separate overseas staffs.

EXHIBIT II

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DETAILS TO OTHER AGENCIES

(Statement prepared by the Department)

Fifteen years ago when a Foreign Service officer returned to the Department of State after an oversea tour, he could normally expect an assignment as a country desk officer. Today, a Foreign Service officer might still be assigned to the Austrian or the Panamanian desk, but he might just as well be detailed to the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, or even to the Department of the Interior. In these departments or any one of a number of other agencies, such as NASA, ACDA, or USIA, Foreign Service officers work as completely integrated members of the host organization, with the same operational and command responsibilities they would have in the State Department. The traditional diplomatist might be astonished at the idea of a Foreign Service officer standing a night watch in the Defense Department. But then the world has changed since the Congress of Vienna and the "new diplomacy" meets the needs of the world today.

The traditional diplomatic functions of reporting, analyzing, negotiation, and representation are as important as ever. The "new diplomacy" reaches far beyond these traditional functions and places new responsibilities on the State Department in its role in coordinating foreign policy and the conduct of our business with other nations. A growing number of other agencies have legitimate and important interests in the foreign affairs field and State in its own work requires the specialized and expert knowledge of those agencies. One way of securing such cooperation and an understanding of each other's problems is to have Foreign Service officers working as an integral part of these other agencies.

In order for the detail program to be fully effective the officer on detail must be an active participant in the work of the agency to which he is temporarily assigned. Consequently, we carefully examine each detail proposal to determine that the officer concerned will have the opportunity to perform a real job and not just an exercise. For example, we are currently establishing an exchange project with the Department of Defense which provides for detailing five Foreign Service officers to the National Military Command Center and a reciprocal detail of five Defense officers to State's Operations Center. These men will not be observers; they will be actual watch officers with responsibilities and authority commensurate with their rank.

The detail must also be of sufficient duration to enable the Foreign Service officer, after learning his new job, to make an effective contribution to the work of the other agency. In most cases a 2-year tour is the rule, but in some instances Foreign Service officers are detailed for longer periods.

The history of the detail program is an interesting sidelight on the growth of U.S. interests since World War II. It began with the Foreign Service Act of 1946 which provided statutory authority for details to other agencies. At first this authority was used somewhat sparingly and was primarily confined to those agencies which had an obvious and close relationship with State. For example, as late as 1958, 52 of a total of 67 details were to Commerce and ICA (now AID); the other 15 were split among Defense, USIA, Labor, and the Operations Coordination Board. These details demonstrated not so much a new direction as a change of emphasis. Commerce and labor affairs, for instance, had been major interests of the Foreign Service for years. Foreign aid, of course, was a new development but its close relationship with foreign policy was so obvious that the use of Foreign Service officers in its implementation was natural and easy.

In the following 3 years numbers changed very little but direction began to change as the growing complexity and scale of diplomacy was recognized. Thus, in 1962, although the total number of details dropped to 61, 5 agencies were added to our list: The White House, Peace Corps, Export-Import Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and Treasury.

In the same year the Herter committee report lent its support to the philosophy underlying much which had been done and provided the basis for an expanded program of details. The report's recommendation with respect to a closely knit family of foreign services and unity of effort in foreign affairs reemphasized the value of details in achieving these aims. In 1963 details more than doubled for a total of 146 which for the first time included the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The increase has continued to the point that at present 130 officers are detailed in Washington to 10 agencies as follows:


ACDA (26), AID (23), Commerce (31), Defense (18), DHEW (1), Labor (2), NASA (2), Peace Corps (10), USIA (5), White House (5), Office of the Vice President (1), and Treasury (6). An additional 30 officers are detailed overseas to USIA (8), AID (20), U.S. Army Map Service (1), and Peace Corps (1). Arrangements are now being made for details to the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of the Budget, Social Security, and the Civil Aeronautics Board.

The present momentum of the detail program and the negotiations at present underway make it evident that the future will witness the continued growth and diversification of the program. As the program expands, however, we will have to begin to weigh the benefits of additional details against the strain on the Department's personnel resources represented by the temporary loss of experienced, qualified officers.

In sum, State Department details to other agencies have increased in number and variety in keeping with the growing complexity and scale of our foreign relations. The detail program has proven itself a capable and beneficial tool for providing more effective cooperation of the State Department with the other departments and agencies having important foreign affairs interests.

(Prepared by the Department of State)

Organization of The Department of State



* A SEPARATE AGENCY WITH THE DIRECTOR REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE SECRETARY AND SERVING AS PRINCIPAL ADVISER TO THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

7/15/63




EXHIBIT IV
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS
(Prepared by the Department of State)

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS	
1	A/DCI - 7 E 12 1/31		2/3/64	HSC Tan	
2	OGC/LC				
3					
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks: <p>Attached is the latest staff report out of the Jackson Subcommittee. I think you will find Part VII. "The Secretary and the Congress" of particular interest. Senator Jackson has sent this to the Director and to me in identical letters and I have acknowledged with thanks both letters</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 40px; margin: 10px auto;"></div> <p style="text-align: right;">John S. Warner LPH</p>					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.				DATE	
OGC/LC 7 D 07				30 Jan	
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	

STAT

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS		
1	Acting Director of Central Intelligence - 7 E 12	2/3/64	MSC/		
2					
3	OGC/LC				
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks: Attached is the latest of the Jackson Subcommittee hearings. The testimony of Secretary Rusk touches on intelligence at page 390. On page 393, Jackson engages Rusk in a discussion of the concept of a National Security Committee. Senator Pell, at page 407, discusses lack of liaison between State Department and CIA during his service in the Department. CIA is also mentioned at page 423 in the Bureau of the Budget.					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE OGC/LC 7 D 07 28 Jan UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET					

STAT

STAT